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Note
Troxel v. Granville: A Missed Opportunity to
Elucidate Children's Rights
Christina M. Alderfer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Robert and Sara Herndon owned an orchard in Missouri.' Their
daughter, Ann, her husband, Randy, and their son, Cody, lived in the
same town. 2 In fact, for eight years, Randy worked at the Herndon's
orchard.3 Cody had a close relationship with his grandparents because
he spent a great deal of time with them at the orchard during preschool
and elementary school.4 Cody's grandparents were active participants
in his life and in many ways helped to raise their grandson. 5  After
Randy was fired from his job at the orchard without warning, the
relationship between Cody's parents and grandparents became strained
and Ann and Randy refused to allow the Herndons to visit with Cody.
6
The Herndons, however, wanted to maintain a relationship with their
grandson and petitioned the court for visitation rights.7
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court that
granted the Herndons visitation with Cody.8 Because of the inconsistent
* J.D. expected May, 2002. I would like to thank my family and friends for their love,
encouragement, and support.
1. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.w.2d 203, 205 (Mo. 1993).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See id. Cody and his grandparents spent a large amount of time together: Cody's
grandmother took him to story hour at the library, Cody's grandfather coached his basketball
team, his grandparents went to see all of Cody's sporting events, his grandmother taught Cody's
Sunday school class, and they also went on vacations together. Id.
6. Id. at 205-06.
7. Id. at 206.
8. Id. at 211. The trial court had ordered visitation on the first and third weekends of each
month and on certain holidays. Id. at 206. The state supreme court stated "[hiaving reviewed the
evidence, we defer to the trial court's finding that grandparent visitation is in the best interests of
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approaches taken by various courts, however, another court may have
reached a different result.9
In response to these inconsistent approaches, the United States
Supreme Court recently decided Troxel v. Granville,l0 a case involving
a state grandparent visitation statute.11 While this case provided the
Supreme Court with the opportunity to resolve the divergent approaches
with respect to grandparent visitation statutes, it did no such thing. 12
Instead, the Court made a decision that offended no one and provided
no clear guidance. 13 If the Herndons petitioned for visitation today, it is
unclear what, if any, effect the Troxel decision would have on the court
that heard the case.14
Until the middle of the twentieth century, the Hemdons would not
have had an avenue by which to petition for visitation with Cody. 15
This is because grandparents had no legal right to visitation with their
grandchildren. 16  Parents were said to have a moral, but not legal,
obligation to allow grandparents to visit their grandchildren. 17  Only in
Cody and would not endanger Cody's physical health or impair his emotional development." Id.
at 211.
9. Infra notes 132-57 and accompanying text (discussing the various approaches taken by
several state supreme courts).
10. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
11. Id. at 2055.
12. Infra notes 311-23 and accompanying text (examining the divergent approaches taken by
different state courts prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Troxel).
13. Infra notes 311-23 and accompanying text (discussing issues unresolved by the Supreme
Court's opinion in Troxel).
14. Infra notes 331-48 and accompanying text (examining the continuing confusion in state
courts over granting grandparent visitation since the Troxel decision).
15. See Michael Quintal, Note, Court-Ordered Families: An Overview of Grandparent-
Visitation Statutes, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 835, 835 (1995); see also David T. Whitehouse,
Comment, Constitutional Law-Grandparent Visitation Rights: North Dakota Declares the
Grandparent Visitation Statute Unconstitutional, 76 N.D. L. REv. 191, 192-93 (2000).
16. Quintal, supra note 15, at 835; see also King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 636 (Ky. 1992)
(Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) (stating that at common law grandparents had no legal right to
visitation with their grandchildren over the objection of the parent).
17. Scott C. Boen, Grandparent Visitation Statutes: The Constitutionality of Court Ordered
Grandparent Visitation Absent a Showing of Harm to the Child, 20 J. JUV. L. 23, 28 (1999); see
also Pier v. Bolles, 596 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Neb. 1999) (stating that at common law the parents'
obligation to allow grandparents to visit with grandchildren was moral, not legal).
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rare situations would courts invoke equity jurisdiction' 8 and allow
visitation to grandparents over the objections of the parents. 19
Prior to the 1960s, courts provided several important reasons for not
granting grandparents visitation rights. 20  First, some judges believed
that granting visitation rights to grandparents would undermine parents'
authority. 2 1 Second, courts were concerned that granting grandparents
visitation rights would place the child in an inter-generational conflict.
22
Many courts reasoned that this conflict would negatively impact on the
child's development and cause emotional or physical trauma to the
child.23 Finally, courts justified this position by holding that parental
autonomy was a fundamental constitutional right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 24
18. Equity is "[j]ustice administered according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly
forumulated rules of common law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990). The
concept of equity is deeply ingrained in American jurisprudence and is usually considered "part
of the inherent powers of the courts." Beth Neu, Note, Wisconsin Brings Child Visitation Out of
the Closet by Granting Standing to Nonparents in Custody of H.S.H.-K., 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 911,
929 (1996). Equity comes from the English system where equity courts were distinguished from
common law courts. Id. at 929 n.76. Courts of equity were originally administered by the Lord
Chancellor and later by the Court of Chancery. Id. During the Middle Ages, litigants could
petition the King for a just result in a case. Id. The King would rely on the advice of his
Chancellor. Id. By the 15th century, however, litigants went directly to the Chancellor who
focused on a fair result instead of strict adherence to the law. Id. By the 19th century, the Court
of Chancery had a body of precedent and established principles. Id. This tradition was adopted
by the American court system, however today most courts are considered both courts of law and
equity. Id.
19. Quintal, supra note 15, at 835-36.
20. Christopher M. Bikus, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Nebraska Supreme Court
Perpetuates the Uncertainty Surrounding the Grandparent Visitation Statute in Eberspacher v.
Hulme, 75 NEB. L. REV. 288, 290-91 (1996); see also Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 192-93.
21. Bikus, supra note 20, at 290; see, e.g., Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1947) (stating that allowing grandparents to interfere in the parent-child relationship "would
injuriously hinder proper paternal authority by dividing it").
22. Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 193.
23. Id.; see, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Flannery v. Sharp, 30 A.2d 810, 812 (Pa. 1943)
(explaining that ordering grandparent visitation against the wishes of a grandchild's parents may
endanger the child's physical and psychological welfare).
24. Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 194. The United States Supreme Court stated in Meyer v.
Nebraska that the Fourteenth Amendment protects "privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923). The Court explained that this includes, without doubt, the freedom to establish a home
and bring up children. Id.; see also infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing Meyer
v. Nebraska). See generally Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995) (holding that
allowing grandparent visitation over a parental objection was a violation of the rights of parents
under Meyer); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that the Grandparents'
Visitation Act violated parents' constitutional right to raise a child).
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Courts in the United States followed this rule until 1965, when state
legislatures began to enact grandparent visitation statutes. 25  States
created these statutes in response to the decline in the "traditional
'nuclear' family" 26 and the desire to retain some aspects of the nuclear
family. 27 Since 1965, all fifty states have enacted statutes 28 providing
25. Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 192-93. New York passed the first visitation statute in
1966. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Deny Grandparents Visiting Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2000,
at Al. By 1986, all fifty states had enacted "grandparent visitation laws that were sponsored by
the American Association for Retired Persons" ("AARP"). David G. Savage, Parents First:
Supreme Court Warns Judges to be Cautious When Granting Visitation Rights to Grandparents,
86 A.B.A. J. 38 (Aug. 2000).
26. The "traditional 'nuclear' family" consists of a heterosexual married couple living
together with their biological or adopted children. Elizabeth Weiss, Comment, Nonparent
Visitation Rights v. Family Autonomy: An Abridgement of Parents' Constitutional Rights?, 10
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1085, 1090 (2000).
27. Id. These statutes were the result of the increasing number of unmarried or divorced
parents, the existence of step-families, the decrease in numbers of grandchildren, and the
increased life span of grandparents. Anne Marie Jackson, Comment, The Coming of Age of
Grandparent Visitation Rights, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 563, 563-64 (1994). The court in Hicks v.
Enlow stated:
The grandparents' visitation statute was an appropriate response to the change in the
demographics of domestic relations, mirrored by the dramatic increase in the divorce
rate and in the number of children born to unmarried parents, and the increasing
independence and alienation within the extended family inherent in a mobile society.
Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W.2d 68, 70-71 (Ky. 1989).
28. All fifty states have enacted either grandparent or third-party visitation statutes. ALA.
CODE § 30-3-4.1 (Supp. 2000); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.065 (Michie 2000); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-409 (West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 3104 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-117 (West 1999
& Supp. 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-59 (1995 & Supp. 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1031(7) (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-
7-3 (1999 & Supp. 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46.3 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2000);
IDAHO CODE § 32-719 (Michie 1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607 (1999 & Supp. 2000); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-17-5-1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.35 (West 1996 &
Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (1993 & Supp. 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021
(BANKS-BALDWIN 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (West 2000 & Supp 2001); LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 136 (West Supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803 (West 1998);
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1999 & Supp. 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39D
(1994 & Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3 (1994 & Supp.
2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (1997 & Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1999 &
Supp. 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125c.050 (Michie
1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17d (1992 & Supp. 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West
1993 & Supp. 2000 & Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2000);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1999);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1997 & Supp. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.051,
3109.11 (West. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.121 (1999 & Supp. 2000); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5311-5313 (West 1991 & Supp.
2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-5-24 to 15-5-24.3 (1996 & Supp. 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-
420(33) (Law. Co-op. 1995 & Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-52 (Michie 1999 &
Supp. 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-6-302, 36-6-306, 36-6-307 (1996 & Supp. 2000); TEX.
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for grandparent visitation or visitation by third parties. 29
The United States Constitution enumerates the areas in which
Congress may legislate. 30  Family issues and grandparent visitation do
not fall within any of these enumerated areas. 31 Therefore, because all
powers not explicitly given to Congress are the domain of the states,
grandparent visitation is regulated by the states. 32  The United States
Supreme Court has shown substantial deference to state courts and
legislatures in the area of family law33 and chose not to hear a case
regarding a grandparent visitation statute until January 2000.
31
This Note will trace the development of the concept that parents have
a liberty interest in raising their children without interference from the
state. 35 This Note then will examine the various types of grandparent
visitation statutes that have developed in different states and the
requirements mandated by different states for visitation to be granted.36
FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.433 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (1998 &
Supp. 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1011-1013 (1998 & Supp. 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
124.2 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001) W. VA.
CODE §§ 48-2B-1 to48-2B-7 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West
1993 & Supp. 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 880.155 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-7-101 (Michie 1999).
29. Boen, supra note 17, at 28.
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Jackson, supra note 27, at 589.
31. Jackson, supra note 27, at 589. While Congress cannot legislate matters of family law,
Congress can indirectly influence state policy. Sarah Norton Harpring, Comment, Wide-Open
Grandparent Visitation Statutes: Is the Door Closing?, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1659, 1680 (1994).
First, Congress can adopt concurrent resolutions, which have no legal force, but which urge states
to pass legislation reflecting the same policy. Id. Alternatively, Congress can condition the
receipt of federal funding on the state's compliance with certain conditions. Id. This requires,
however, that the conditions bear some nexus to the funding. Id. The Subcommittee on Human
Services of the House Select Committee on Aging conducted hearings on the subject of
grandparent visitation rights in 1982 and 1983. Id. Several years later, a concurrent resolution
was adopted by the House and the Senate which called for the development and enactment of a
uniform state act. Id. Despite the adoption of the concurrent resolution, state statutes continue to
vary significantly. See infra Part II.C (discussing the various types of grandparent visitation
statutes).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment states, "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people. Id.; see also Jackson, supra note 27, at 589.
33. Erica L. Strawman, Grandparent Visitation: The Best Interests of the Grandparent, Child,
and Society, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 31, 35 (1998). "[F]amily law has been the province of state
legislature, and state courts, with only rare occasions for Supreme Court intervention on such
questions as the right of parents to choose private rather than public schools .... Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Deny Grandparent Visiting Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2000, at Al.
34. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
35. Infra Part II.B (reviewing the United States Supreme Court cases that established parents'
liberty interests in raising children).
36. Infra Part I.C (examining the types of grandparent visitation statutes that have developed
in different states).
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This Note will then consider the approaches taken by various state
supreme courts that have examined grandparent visitation statutes.37
Next, this Note will review the state court decisions and the plurality,
concurring, and dissenting opinions in the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville.38 This Note will then argue that
there were three major problems with the Supreme Court's decision in
this case that render the decision unhelpful. 39 Finally, this Note will
discuss the minimal impact this decision has had on state courts and the
continued confusion that exists about the requirements necessary before
grandparent visitation is granted. n'
II. BACKGROUND
This section of the Note will examine the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and the liberty interest of individuals
protected by that amendment. 41 Next, this section will review the line
of United States Supreme Court cases that established that parents have
a fundamental liberty interest in raising their children.42 This section
will then consider the different types of state visitation statutes and the
varying requirements imposed by states that must be satisfied before
visitation is granted.43 Finally, this section will examine the approaches
taken by various state supreme courts in analyzing the constitutionality
of the state's grandparent visitation statute and the factors that influence
a state court's decision. 44
A. The Liberty Interest Protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that
"[n]o state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." 45  There are two aspects to the Due
Process Clause: procedural due process and substantive due process. 46
37. Infra Part II.D (comparing and reviewing several states' supreme court decisions where
grandparent visitation was at issue).
38. Infra Part III (reviewing the state court decisions and the United States Supreme Court
decision in Troxel).
39. Infra Part IV (detailing the problems with the United States Supreme Court's decision in
TroxeO.
40. Infra Part V (discussing the minimal impact the Troxel decision has had on subsequent
grandparent visitation cases).
41. Infra Part II.A.
42. Infra Part II.B.
43. Infra Part II.C.
44. Infra Part ll.D.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1.
46. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (6th ed. 1990). The due process clause consists of a
20011 Troxel v. Granville
Substantive due process operates to protect those liberty interests
referred to by the Fourteenth Amendment47 and is applicable when a
state action infringes on an individual's interest in life, liberty, or
property.48 The Supreme Court has held that some of these liberty
interests are fundamental,49 primarily meaning that the interests are
related to the right of privacy. 50  Such interests include the areas of
marriage, childbearing, and child rearing. 51 The United States Supreme
Court has long given deference to the right of parents to raise a child
according to their wishes.52 This right was long ago held to be a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. 53 The Court has not defined, however,
the extent of this liberty interest.54 Therefore, the scope of parents'
fundamental liberty interest in raising their children is unclear.
55
procedural aspect and a substantive aspect. Id. Procedural due process guarantees that
individuals receive a particular process in the event that they are deprived of life, liberty, or
property. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 510 (5th ed. 1995).
By comparison, substantive due process protects certain fundamental rights or voids arbitrary
limitations on individual freedom. Id.
47. Neu, supra note 18, at 940-41.
48. Mark Moody, Note, Constitutional Questions Regarding Grandparent Visitation and Due
Process Standards, 60 MO. L. REV. 195, 199 (1995).
49. See Neu, supra note 18, at 941. The Supreme Court has held that a liberty interest
protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will be deemed
fundamental if it is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (considering whether the
state's right to appeal in a criminal case violated the defendant's fundamental liberty rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). The Court has also referred to "those personal
activities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in our history and
traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, that they are
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997)
(considering whether assistance in committing suicide is a fundamental liberty interest).
50. Karen Alyssa Nalle, Comment, Whose Child is it Anyway?: The Unconstitutionality of the
Texas Grandparent Visitation Statute, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 721, 730 (1999).
51. Id.
52. Weiss, supra note 26, at 1085; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (stating
that Wisconsin's compulsory secondary school attendance law was unconstitutional as applied to
the Amish); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (establishing that parents have a right
to send their children to private schools by holding that a statute that required all children to
attend public school was unconstitutional); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding a
statute that prohibited teaching lessons in a foreign language to be unconstitutional and
concluding that parents may engage a foreign language instructor to teach their children in
school).
53. Boen, supra note 17, at 26. This was made clear in the seminal case of Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399. See also infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing the
facts, holding, and rationale of the Court in Meyer).
54. Neu, supra note 18, at 941.
55. Id. The Constitution does not mention the family or the parent-child relationship, and,
therefore, judges have been provided with little guidance from the framers about the scope of
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B. Case Law Establishing Parents' Fundamental Liberty Interest in
Raising their Children
More than seventy-five years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska,56 the United
States Supreme Court first acknowledged parents' Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest in raising their children. 57  In this seminal
case, the Court held unconstitutional a statute that prohibited instruction
in any language, other than English, to a schoolchild who had not
graduated from the eighth grade. 58 The Court explained that while the
liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment had not
previously been precisely defined, it protects more than freedom from
bodily restraint and must also include the right to raise children without
interference from the state. 59  Meyer, therefore, recognized parents'
rights to raise their children as a liberty interest in which the state may
not interfere without due process of law. 6° This liberty interest included
the parents' right to have an instructor teach lessons to their children in
a language other than English.6'
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,62 the Supreme Court
examined a statute that required all children between the ages of eight
and sixteen to attend a public school.63 The Court reaffirmed parents'
liberty interest in controlling the upbringing of their children. 64 While
parental rights. Andrew Schepard, Muddled Impact of the High Court's Grandparent Visitation
Decision, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 2000, at 3.
56. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In this landmark case, a schoolteacher, Robert
Meyer, was convicted under a Nebraska statute that prohibited the teaching of any subject in any
language other than English to a student who had not yet graduated from the eighth grade. Id. at
396-97. Meyer had taught a reading lesson in the German language to a ten-year-old child. Id. at
396. While the Court acknowledged the state's legitimate interest in regulating children's
education, the Court held that the schoolteacher's right to teach and the right of parents to engage
him to instruct their children are within the liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and therefore, the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 399-402.
57. Id. at 399-400; Weiss, supra note 26, at 1087.
58. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397-402.
59. Id. at 399. The Court stated:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed... [wlithout doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to... establish a home and bring up children ... and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 400.
62. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
63. Id. at 530.
64. Id. at 534-35. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute at issue in Pierce interfered with the
right of parents to select where their children would "receive appropriate mental and religious
970 [Vol. 32
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the Court recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in regulating
schools and requiring all children of certain ages to attend school, this
interest was outweighed by the parents' interests in directing the raising
of their children.
65
More recently, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,66 the Supreme Court reiterated
the right of parents to control their children's education by examining a
compulsory school-attendance law. The law, challenged by several
Amish parents, required students to attend school until age sixteen.
67
The Court acknowledged two competing interests in this case. 68 First,
the Amish parents had a First Amendment right to religious freedom in
conjunction with their right to direct their children's upbringing,69 and,
second, the state had an interest as parens patriae70 in extending the
training, the fight of children to influence their parents' choice of a school, the right of schools
and teachers therein to engage in business or profession." Id. at 532. The Court stated that under
the doctrine set forth in Meyer v. Nebraska it was clear the statute "unreasonably interferes with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control." Id. at 534-35.
65. Id. The Court declared that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations." Id. at 535.
66. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
67. Id. Some Amish parents refused to send their children to school after the eighth grade,
believing that by sending their children to high school they would expose them to a "worldly"
influence in conflict with their religious beliefs. Id. at 207-11. They argued that this violated
their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 208-09. The First Amendment to
the United States Constitution states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. This is made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment which states, "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United
States .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
68. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. The Court explained that "a State's interest in universal
education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on fundamental rights and interests ... of parents .... Id.
69. Id. at 232-33. Again emphasizing parents' rights to control the rearing of their children,
the Court stated, "[tihe history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition." Id. at 232.
70. Parens patriae translated literally means "parent of the country" and refers to the role of a
state as the sovereign and guardian of people under legal disability, including juveniles. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). When the state is acting as parens patriae it acts from the
viewpoint and on behalf of the child. Joan C. Bohl, The "Unprecedented Intrusion": A Survey
and Analysis of Selected Grandparent Visitation Cases, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 68 (1996). In the
United States, the idea of parens patriae can be traced to the King's authority under the English
law to serve as the "'guardian of persons under legal disabilities .... - Id. at 68-69 (quoting
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972)). Chancellors, acting on behalf of the
King, assumed responsibility for subjects who were legally unable to care for themselves and for
their property. Id. at 69. Originally, patens patriae corresponded to a payment to the King, but
by the 17th century the power was used to provide support and education for children in need
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benefits of secondary education to each child regardless of the parents'
wishes. 71 The Court recognized that both are legitimate interests, but
held that in this case, the parents' interests outweighed the state's
interests. 72  The Court, therefore, held that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prevented the state from exercising its parens patriae
power and compelling the Amish parents to send their children to high
school until the age of sixteen.
73
The right of parents to dictate the care, upbringing, and control of
their children, however, is not absolute. 74 This was first made clear in
Prince v. Massachusetts,75 where the Court examined a Massachusetts
child labor law that prohibited any girl under the age of eighteen from
selling newspapers or magazines on the street or in any public place. 76
While the Court in Prince recognized that the care of a child resides
first with the parents, it stated that the family is not beyond regulation
when it is in the public interest to do so, even against a claim involving
religious liberty.77 The Court explained that under some circumstances
regardless of any direct financial benefit to the King. Id.
71. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229. The Court stated that "[t]here is no doubt as to the power of a
State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations
for the control and duration of basic education." Id. at 213.
72. Id. at 232-34.
73. Id. at 234.
74. E.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (limiting the absolute requirement of parental
consent for a minor's abortion); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (stating that the
state has the authority to limit parental rights, including limiting parents' rights to dictate the age
at which a child begins to work). There are two sources of the state's authority to intrude in the
parent-child relationship. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 28 (Wash. 1998). The state is allowed to act
pursuant to its police power to protect citizens from harm inflicted by third parties or to protect
citizens from any threats to their health and safety. Id. For example, this police power allows the
state to require that children be vaccinated against communicable diseases over the objections of
fit parents and allows the state to override a parent's decision if that decision would severely
harm a child. Bohl, supra note 70, at 68. The state may act as parens patriae in which the state
acts from the viewpoint and on behalf of the interests of the child. Smith, 969 P.2d at 28.
75. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
76. Id. at 159-61. In Prince, a nine-year-old girl's aunt, who was also her guardian, was
convicted of violating a Massachusetts child labor law. Id. The child and her aunt were
Jehovah's Witnesses and they were offering religious publications on the streets of Brockton,
Massachusetts. Id. at 161. The Court recognized that two claimed liberties were at stake. Id. at
164. The first liberty interest involved was the parent's liberty interest in choosing how to raise
the child, which in this case included teachings about the tenets and practices of their shared faith.
Id. The second liberty interest involved was that of the child to preach the gospel according to the
scripture, "a little child shall lead them." Id. The Bible states that "[t]he wolf shall dwell with the
lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf and lion and the fatling together,
and a little child shall lead them." Isaiah 11:6.
77. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. The Supreme Court has recognized the limitations on parents'
authority to control their children in other cases, as well. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-
34 (1972). In Yoder, the Court's decision was based upon the unique circumstances of the case
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the state, as parens patriae, will interfere with a parents' liberty interest
in controlling the upbringing of their children, such as by requiring
attendance in school or prohibiting child labor.78 The Court concluded
that in areas affecting children's welfare the state has a significant range
of power to limit parental freedom and authority.79 While the Court
made its decision after weighing the rights of the state and the rights of
the parents, the Court recognized, for the first time, that children have
liberty interests protected by the Constitution. 80
While all states acknowledge that under some circumstances the state
possesses the authority to interfere in the parent-child relationship,
states have reached differing conclusions on the issue of whether
granting visitation to nonparents is within the state's authority as parens
patriae.8 1
and the Amish convictions. Brief for Petitioners at 24, Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054
(2000) (No. 99-138). The Yoder Court did not believe that the parent-child relationship was, by
itself, sufficient to support the constitutional claim asserted by the parents. Id. The Court
explained that "the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject
to limitation ... if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the
child, or have a potential for significant social burdens." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34.
78. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. The Court reasoned that "neither rights of religion nor rights of
parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the
state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating
or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways." Id. (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 167. The Court stated "the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental
freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and that this includes, to some
extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction." Id. The Court went on to say:
The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of
adults .... A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It
may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of
selection .... It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to
reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's claim
to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
Id. at 168-69. The Court recognized there will be instances where parents will make decisions
that are not in the interests of their children and stated that "[p]arents may be free to become
martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they
can make that choice for themselves." Id. at 170.
80. Id. at 164-65.
81. E.g., Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995) (holding that Georgia's grandparent
visitation statute unconstitutionally violates the protected interest of parents to raise their children
without state interference); King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992) (holding that Kentucky's
grandparent visitation statute was constitutional); see infra Part II.D (explaining how several
different states have approved statutes providing for grandparent visitation).
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C. State Visitation Statutes
There are two main categories under which grandparent visitation
statutes are grouped, the "special circumstances" statutes and the "open
ended" statutes.82 The "special circumstances" statute83 represents the
majority of jurisdictions and requires some sort of triggering event
causing a disruption to the traditional family unit.84 Most of these
statutes only allow visitation by the grandparents under specific
circumstances. 85  Such circumstances include the divorce or legal
82. Boen, supra note 17, at 29. These statutes vary significantly. John DeWitt Gregory,
Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351,
369-70 (1998). In fact, according to one commentator, "[t]he enactments and the scope of the
rights granted are of an enormous variety and virtually defy rational classification." Id. at 371.
83. Arkansas' grandparent visitation statute is a "special circumstances" statute. The statute
states:
(a)(1) Upon petition by a person properly before it, a chancery court of this state may
grant grandparents and great-grandparents reasonable visitation rights with respect to
their grandchild or grandchildren or great-grandchild or great-grandchildren at any
time if:
(A) The marital relationship between the parents of the child has been severed
by death, divorce, or legal separation; or
(B) The child is in the custody or under the guardianship of a person other than
one (1) or both of his natural or adoptive parents; or
(C) The child is illegitimate, and the person is a maternal grandparent of the
illegitimate child; or
(D) The child is illegitimate, and the person is a paternal grandparent of the
illegitimate child, and paternity has been established by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
(2) The visitation rights may only be granted when the court determines that such an
order would be in the best interest and welfare of the minor.
(3) (A) An order denying visitation rights to the grandparents and great-
grandparents shall be in writing and shall state the reasons for denial.
(B) An order denying visitation rights is a final order for the purposes of appeal.
(b) If the court denies the petition requesting grandparent visitation rights and
determines that the petition for grandparent visitation rights is not well-founded, was
filed with malicious intent or purpose, or is not in the best interest and welfare of the
child, the court may, upon motion of the respondent, order the petitioner to pay
reasonable attorney's fees and court costs of the attorney of the respondent, after taking
into consideration the financial ability of the petitioner and the circumstances involved.
(c) The provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall only be applicable
in situations:
(1) In which there is a severed marital relationship between the parents of the
natural or adoptive children by either death, divorce, or legal separation; or
(2) In which the child is in the custody or under the guardianship of a person
other than one (1) or both of his natural or adoptive parents; or
(3) If the child is illegitimate.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103 (Michie 1999).
84. Boen, supra note 17, at 29.
85. Quintal, supra note 15, at 839.
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separation of the parents, or the death of a natural parent. 86 Absent one
of these situations, grandparents have no standing to petition for
visitation. 87
The "open ended" statute88 represents the minority of jurisdictions
and permits courts to grant visitation regardless of the family
situation. 89 These statutes permit courts to grant grandparent visitation
even when the family unit is still intact and one or both of the parents
object to the visitation. 90 While most statutes only allow grandparents
to petition for visitation, some state statutes allow other individuals to
petition for visitation with a child as well. 91
The state statutes vary not only in the requirements of whether a
disruption to the family unit must be demonstrated, but also in whether,
prior to permitting interference with parental rights, there must be a
determination that a denial of visitation would cause harm to the child.92
Citing to the United States Supreme Court cases discussed above, some
courts interpret state statutes to require that visitation be denied unless
there has been a determination that denial of visitation would cause
harm to the child.93 By comparison, some state courts have interpreted
the state's statute as allowing visitation without a finding that the child
would be harmed if visitation did not occur. 94
Regardless of the specific requirements of the statute, once the
standing requirements 95 have been satisfied, almost all jurisdictions
look to the facts of a particular case to determine whether visitation
would be in the best interests of the child.96 Some statutes enumerate
86. Id.
87. Id. at 842.
88. Maryland's grandparent visitation statute is an "open ended" statute. The statute states:
"An equity court may: (1) consider a petition for reasonable visitation with a grandchild by a
grandparent; and (2) if the court finds it to be in the best interests of the child, grant visitation
rights to the grandparent." MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102 (1999).
89. Boen, supra note 17, at 29.
90. Quintal, supra note 15, at 840.
91. Id. at 839.
92. Weiss, supra note 26, at 1097.
93. Id. at 1099-1100; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (establishing the right of
parents to dictate the care, upbringing, and control of their children).
94. Weiss, supra note 26, at 1100.
95. "'Standing to sue' means that [a] party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
controversy [so as] to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1405 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972)). The standing
requirement is satisfied if the plaintiff has a tangible interest at stake in the litigation that can be
legally protected. Id.
96. Quintal, supra note 15, at 836. Some commentators have observed that courts sometimes
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specific factors the court must weigh to determine whether visitation
would be in the child's best interests, 97 while others rely on the court's
general discretion to make such a determination. 98  Regardless of the
type of statute, many visitation statutes have been constitutionally
challenged on the ground that they violate parents' rights to raise their
children free from state interference. 99
D. Approaches of Various State Supreme Courts
Many grandparent visitation statutes have been challenged on the
theory that they violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which protects against state action °° that infringes upon
an individual's fundamental rights and liberty interests.101 This
argument rests on the premise that these statutes violate parents'
fundamental liberty interests in raising their children and controlling the
grant visitation based on the questionable presumption that visitation with grandparents is always
in the child's best interests. Id. at 844.
97. For example, the court might consider whether the child has lived with the grandparent,
the frequency of contact, the substance of the relationship, and what effects grandparent visitation
will have on the ability of the parent to raise the child. Id. at 845-47.
98. Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 200.
99. Id. at 200-01.
100. "State action" is a term that is generally used in connection with claims under the Due
Process Clause or the Civil Rights Act for which a private citizen is seeking damages or redress
because of improper governmental intrusion into his or her life. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1407 (6th ed. 1990). In determining whether the action constitutes "state action" under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a court must determine whether a sufficient nexus exists between the
state and the challenged action so that the action may fairly be regarded as an action of the state
itself. Id.
101. Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 201; see also Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga.
1995) (holding that Georgia's grandparent visitation statute violated the constitutionally protected
interest of parents to raise their children free from undue state interference since it did not
promote the health or welfare of the child and did not require a finding of harm before state
interference was permitted); King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992) (concluding that
Kentucky's grandparent visitation statute was constitutional and did not unduly intrude on the
parent-child relationship); Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993) (stating that
Missouri's grandparent visitation statute was constitutional since it involved only a minimal
intrusion in the family relationship and it was narrowly tailored to protect the interests of parents
and children); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that Tennessee's
grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional under the state constitution because it violated
the right to privacy in making parental decisions); Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d 417 (Va.
1998) (determining that a Virginia court will only consider the child's best interests after a
finding that harm will result to the child if visitation is not ordered); Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d
1144 (Wyo. 1995) (finding that Wyoming's grandparent visitation statute was constitutional
because it did not violate the Due Process Clause).
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people with whom their children associate. 102 This fundamental liberty
interest was established in cases such as Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder.
103
State supreme courts that have heard cases involving grandparent
visitation statutes have reached differing conclusions. 104 The
conclusions the courts have reached are influenced by each court's
conception of three separate factors: the level of scrutiny used to review
a statute, the sources of the state power to become involved in the
parent-child relationship, and the court's view of the family integrity
right. 1
05
To determine whether a statute violates the Due Process Clause, a
court must first determine under which level of scrutiny, rational basis
or strict scrutiny, the statute will be analyzed. 1°6 The level of scrutiny
the court chooses to apply to the grandparent visitation statute often
dictates whether the statute will be held constitutional or
unconstitutional.10 7
Rational basis review is the easiest standard of review that can be
applied to a statute when a constitutional challenge is made.'0 This
standard will be applied to a statute in two situations.1°9 First, rational
basis will be applied when no fundamental liberty interest is
102. Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 201.
103. Supra Part II.B (discussing the United States Supreme Court cases establishing parents'
fundamental liberty interest in raising their children).
104. See e.g., Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 773-74 (holding that Georgia's grandparent visitation
statute violated the constitutionally protected interest of parents to raise their children free from
undue state interference since it did not promote the health or welfare of the child and did not
require a finding of harm before state interference was permitted); King, 828 S.W.2d at 632
(concluding that Kentucky's grandparent visitation statute was constitutional and did not unduly
intrude on the parent-child relationship); Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210 (stating that Missouri's
grandparent visitation statute was constitutional since it involved only a minimal intrusion in the
family relationship and it was narrowly tailored to protect the interests of parents and children);
Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 582 (holding that Tennessee's grandparent visitation statute was
unconstitutional under the state constitution because it violated the right to privacy in making
parental decisions); Williams, 501 S.E.2d at 418 (determining that a Virginia court will only
consider the child's best interests after a finding that harm will result to the child if visitation is
not ordered); Michael, 900 P.2d at 1151 (stating that Wyoming's grandparent visitation statute
was constitutional because it did not violate the Due Process Clause).
105. Bohl, supra note 70, at 34.
106. See Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 201. Rational basis and strict scrutiny were the only
two levels of review that existed until 1992. Moody, supra note 48, at 200. In 1992, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994), the United States Supreme Court created a middle
level of review, undue burden, to apply in abortion cases involving issues of substantive due
process. Id. In that case, the plurality stated that in order for a statute involving abortion to be
deemed unconstitutional, the state action must place an "undue burden" on a woman's choice. Id.
107. See Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 202.
108. See Moody, supra note 48, at 200.
109. Id.
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implicated.11 ° Second, this standard may be applied when the court
determines that a fundamental liberty interest has not been infringed
upon by the alleged state action."l Under the rational basis review, a
statute must only "be rationally related to a legitimate government
interest." 112 The statute will be upheld, therefore, if the state's action in
granting visitation bears a reasonable relationship to a justifiable state
interest. 113 At this level of review, the state action in granting visitation
will almost always survive the constitutional analysis unless there is
absolutely no rational relation between the grant of visitation and any
valid governmental interest. 114
As compared to the minimal scrutiny of rational basis review, strict
scrutiny is the most difficult level of scrutiny for a state action to
survive. 115  This level of scrutiny is applied when the state action
infringes on a fundamental liberty interest. 116 A state action that
infringes on a fundamental liberty interest can only be upheld if it
furthers a compelling government interest.117 Even if the state's interest
is compelling, the state action must be narrowly tailored, meaning that
the statute must be the least restrictive means of achieving the state's
objective." l8  Indeed, a state action need not ban an activity completely
in order to infringe on a fundamental right and, thereby, trigger a strict
scrutiny analysis. 119  Consequently, state actions that infringe on
fundamental rights are normally presumed to be unconstitutional. 120
Therefore, at this level of scrutiny, a grant of visitation will be upheld
110. Id.
111. Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 202.
112. Id.
113. Id.; see, e.g., King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992) (stating that the state statute
is an appropriate response to the disintegration of the family and bears a reasonable relation to the
objective it is trying to achieve); Hemdon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 208-10 (Mo. 1993)
(applying rational basis review and holding that Missouri's grandparent visitation statute was
constitutional).
114. See Moody, supra note 48, at 200.
115. Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 202.
116. Id.
117. Moody, supra note 48, at 199-200; see, e.g., Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271, 1276
(Fla. 1996) (quoting Winfield v. Div. of Parimutuel Wagering, 477 So.2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1985)
and stating that the statute can only be upheld "by demonstrating that the challenged regulation
serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through the use of the least intrusive
means"); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tenn. 1993) (applying strict scrutiny and holding
that Tennessee's grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional).
118. See Moody, supra note 48, at 200.
119. Id.
120. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV.
625, 638 (1992).
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only if it furthers a compelling government interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that objective. 121
A court's interpretation of the breadth of the state's police and parens
patriae powers to become involved in the parent-child relationship is
another factor that influences its decision about the constitutionality of
its grandparent visitation statute. 122  The courts that have held
grandparent visitation statutes to be constitutional have focused on the
state's role as parens patriae in protecting the child. 123  These courts
have considered the rights of all the parties involved and have required
that visitation only minimally infringe on the parents' privacy rights. 124
By comparison, courts that have invalidated a state's grandparent
visitation statute generally have held that the state does not have a
legitimate source of authority to interfere in the parent-child relationship
absent a finding of parental unfitness, harm to the child, or the threat of
harm to the child. 125
Yet another consideration that influences a court's analysis of its
grandparent visitation statute is the court's approach to the concept of
family integrity. 126  Courts that have held "open ended" grandparent
visitation statutes constitutional have viewed the right to family
integrity as a limited right which is not offended by these statutes. 127
121. See Moody, supra note 48, at 199-200.
122. See Bohl, supra note 70, at 68-69.
123. See Toni Eddy, Article, Grandparent Visitation Rights in Ohio When the Family is
Intact, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 197, 212 (1999); see, e.g., King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992);
Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993); Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144 (Wyo.
1995).
124. Eddy, supra note 123, at 212. The Supreme Court of Missouri stated that "visitation
rights by grandparents.., are less than [a] substantial encroachment on a family." Herndon, 857
S.W.2d at 209. The court went on to say:
Missouri's statute is reasonable both because it contemplates only a minimal intrusion
on the family relationship and because it is narrowly tailored to adequately protect the
interests of parents and children. The statute provides that a court may grant visitation
to a grandparent only if the grandparent has been unreasonably denied visitation for
more than ninety days. A court may grant visitation only if it will be in the best
interest of the child.
Id. at 210.
125. Bohl, supra note 70, at 70; see, e.g., Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 1996);
Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
The Supreme Court of Georgia stated in Brooks v. Parkerson, "[tihe statute in question is
unconstitutional under both the state and federal constitutions because it does not clearly promote
the health or welfare of the child and does not require a showing of harm before state interference
is authorized." 454 S.E.2d at 774.
126. See Bohl, supra note 70, at 34.
127. Id. at48.
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This conclusion is based on one of two lines of reasoning. 128 First,
some courts have found that the family integrity right is limited. 129
Second, some courts have viewed grandparent visitation as permissible
because such visitation does not amount to a significant enough
invasion of the family to implicate any right to familial autonomy. 130 In
contrast, courts that have found state grandparent visitation statutes
unconstitutional view the right to family integrity in a comprehensive
manner such that the state may not interfere in the family through a
grandparent visitation order. 131
State courts have reached differing conclusions on the
constitutionality of state grandparent visitation statutes based on the
courts' treatment of these three factors. 132  For example, Kentucky
128. Id.
129. Id.; see, e.g., King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Ky. 1992) (explaining that while "the
Constitution ... does recognize the right to rear children without undue governmental
interference, that right is not inviolate"); Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 207 (stating that the
constitutional right to freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is not absolute).
130. Bohl, supra note 70, at 49; see, e.g., Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 208, 220 (stating that "the
magnitude of the infringement by the state is a significant consideration in determining whether a
statute will be struck down as unconstitutional" and that "visitation rights by grandparents... are
less than [a] substantial encroachment on a family"); Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 642
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding that "visitation rights... do not substantially infringe upon the
parent's fundamental rights or the autonomy of the nuclear family").
131. See Bohl, supra note 70, at 46-47; see, e.g., Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 772
(Ga. 1995) (explaining that "[tihe right to the custody and control of one's child is a fiercely
guarded right in our society and in our law") (quoting In re Suggs, 291 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. 1982));
Lingo v. Kelsay, 651 So.2d 499, 500 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that "[i]t is well settled that the
right of parents to custody of their children is paramount"); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579
(Tenn. 1993) (discussing the rights of parents to raise their children without interference from the
state).
132. Bohl, supra note 70, at 34; see e.g., Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271 (Fla. 1996)
(finding that Florida's grandparent visitation statute which allowed visitation over at least one
parent's objection in an intact family violated the fundamental rights of parents under the state
constitution); Brooks, 454 S.E.2d 769 (holding that Georgia's grandparent visitation statute
violates the right of parents to raise children without undue state interference guaranteed by the
state constitution and federal Constitution); King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (concluding that Kentucky's
visitation statute which provided for grandparent visitation was constitutional and did not unduly
intrude in the fundamental rights of parents); Fairbanks v. McCarter, 622 A.2d 121 (Md. 1993)
(holding that the decision to grant visitation under Maryland's grandparent visitation statute
should be based exclusively on the best interests of the grandchild); Herndon, 857 S.W.2d 203
(holding that Missouri's statute, providing for grandparent visitation if it was in the best interests
of the child, was constitutional); Brown v. Earnhardt, 396 S.E.2d 358 (S.C. 1990) (concluding
that grandparents are not entitled to visitation rights absent exceptional circumstances); Hawk,
855 S.W.2d 573 (concluding that Tennessee's grandparent visitation statute, as applied to fit,
married parents who have maintained custody of their children, violated the right to privacy in
parenting decisions guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution); Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (holding
that Utah's grandparent visitation statute was constitutional); Williams v. Williams, 501 S.E.2d
417 (Va. 1998) (stating that the court cannot award visitation to grandparents when there is no
allegation or proof that denying grandparents visitation would be detrimental to the child's
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allows reasonable visitation to grandparents when visitation is in the
best interests of the child.'33 In 1992, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
applied rational basis review 134  when it examined the state's
grandparent visitation statute in King v. King.135 The court recognized
that the Constitution protects the right to raise children without undue
governmental interference but noted that the right is not inviolate. 136 In
addition, the court noted that legislatures increasingly pass legislation to
protect the safety, education, and the physical and emotional welfare of
children.137  Further, the court explained that there are benefits to be
derived from the grandparent-grandchild bond. 138 The court stated that
in a time when society has seen a disintegration of the family, the
visitation statute was an appropriate response by the General Assembly
to attempt to strengthen familial relationships.' 39 The court stated that
the statute at issue sought to balance the fundamental rights of parents,
welfare); Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 1995) (finding that Wyoming's grandparent
visitation statute did not violate a parent's due process right).
133. Eddy, supra note 123, at 206.
134. See Bohl, supra note 70, at 54-55.
135. King, 828 S.W.2d 630. In King, W.R. King ("Mr. King") petitioned for visitation with
his granddaughter Jessica. Id. at 63 1. Jessica and her parents, Stewart and Ann King, lived in a
house located on Mr. King's farm which he had built for them. Id. at 630. Stewart and his family
lived in the home rent-free. Id. Stewart worked for a company full time and also worked on the
family farm. Id. When Jessica was sixteen-months-old, Mr. King ordered Stewart to move his
family out of the house because Mr. King felt that Stewart was not working enough on the farm.
Id. In addition, Mr. King thought that Stewart drank too much. Id. Stewart and Ann thought that
Stewart's father was "overbearing and intrusive." Id. Mr. King had contact almost everyday with
Jessica while she lived on the farm. Id. After the family moved out, Mr. King requested
visitation with Jessica but it was denied by his son and daughter-in-law. Id. at 630-31. Mr. King
then filed a petition for visitation under the state statute. Id. at 631. The visitation statute stated,
"[t]he circuit court may grant reasonable visitation rights to either the paternal or maternal
grandparents of a child and issue any necessary orders to enforce the decree if it determines that it
is in the best interests of the child to do so." Id. (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021(1)
(Banks-Baldwin 1990)).
136. Id. at 631. The court stated that:
While the Constitution, as interpreted by the various courts, does recognize the right to
rear children without undue governmental interference, that right is not inviolate.
Parents are required by law to see that their children are educated. Children must be
inoculated against disease. Parents cannot abuse their children. Severe restrictions are
placed upon the employment of children. Children must be restrained while riding in a
motor vehicle.
Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 632. The visitation statute was an "appropriate response to the change in the
demographics of domestic relations, mirrored by the dramatic increase in the divorce rate and in
the number of children born to unmarried parents, and the increasing independence and alienation
within the extended family inherent in a mobile society." Id. (quoting Hicks v. Enlow, 764
S.W.2d 68, 70-71 (Ky. 1989)).
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grandparents, and children, 140 and in most cases visitation will be
beneficial to both the grandchild and the grandparent.' 4' The court,
therefore, held that the extremely broad statute was constitutional
because the legislature had confined the situations in which
grandparents could seek visitation to those instances when it would
serve the best interests of the child. 142
Other state supreme courts have also held the state's visitation statute
to be constitutional. 143 For example, one year after King, the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that its grandparent visitation statute did not
violate the Constitution. 144  As in K i n g, the Herndon court
acknowledged that parents have a constitutionally protected right to
make decisions about their family. The court, however, reached its
140. Id. According to the dissenting opinion, the fatal flaw in the majority's opinion was its
conclusion that a grandparent has a fundamental right to visitation with a grandchild. Id. at 633
(Lambert, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that no authority was cited for this proposition
and stated that this is because there is no such right. Id. (Lambert, J., dissenting). Therefore, the
majority simply pointed out the positive benefits both grandchildren and grandparents would
derive from a continued relationship. Id. at 632 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
If a grandparent is physically, mentally and morally fit, then a grandchild will
ordinarily benefit from contact with the grandparent. That grandparents and
grandchildren normally have a special bond cannot be denied. Each benefits from
contact with the other. The child can learn respect, a sense of responsibility and love.
The grandparent can be invigorated by exposure to youth, can gain an insight into our
changing society, and can avoid the loneliness which is so often a part of an aging
parent's life. These considerations by the state do not go too far in intruding into the
fundamental rights of the parents.
Id.
142. Julie E. Nichols, Note, Grandpa Take Me Home: The Unconstitutionality of the
Michigan Grandparent Visitation Statute Under the Due Process Clause, 43 WAYNE L. REV.
1887, 1909 (1997).
143. E.g., Fairbanks v. McCarter, 622 A.2d 121 (Md. 1993) (holding that the decision to grant
visitation under Maryland's grandparent visitation statute should be based exclusively on the best
interests of the grandchild); Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993) (holding that
Missouri's statute that provided for grandparent visitation if it was in the best interests of the
child was constitutional); Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 1995) (finding that
Wyoming's grandparent visitation statute did not violate a parent's due process right).
144. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 209-10. Missouri's statute provided that, among other things,
the court could grant visitation to a grandparent if the grandparent had been unreasonably denied
visitation for ninety days so long as visitation would be in the grandchild's best interests. Id. at
207. Missouri's grandparent visitation statute stated:
The court may grant grandparent visitation when ... [a] grandparent is unreasonably
denied visitation with the child for a period exceeding ninety days.... The court shall
determine if the visitation by the grandparent would be in the child's best interest or if
it would endanger the child's physical health or impair his emotional development.
Visitation may only be ordered when the court finds such visitation to be in the best
interests of the child.
Id. at 206-07.
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conclusion based on different reasoning. 145  The court held that the
nature and scope of the state's infringement is an important
consideration in determining whether the statute is constitutional.
146
The court determined that the statute was reasonable because it involved
only minimal intrusion on the family, and the visitation rights provided
for in the statute were not enough of an encroachment on the family to
render the statute unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
47
In contrast, courts that have held the state's statute to be
unconstitutional have considered the parents' rights to be paramount
and have stated that visitation is permissible only if it is necessary to
avoid some harm to the child. 148 Additionally, these courts have, either
expressly or implicitly, applied the strict scrutiny standard. 149  For
example, in Hawk v. Hawk,150 the Supreme Court of Tennessee held
that its state visitation statute was unconstitutional under the state
constitution. 151  Like Kentucky, Tennessee had a fairly broad
145. See id. at 207-10.
146. Id. at 208. "Even given the fact that the parents have a constitutional right to make
decisions affecting the family, the magnitude of the infringement by the state is a significant
consideration in determining whether a statute will be struck down as unconstitutional." Id.
147. Id. at 208-09. The court concluded that rational basis review was the appropriate level of
scrutiny because granting grandparent visitation was not a substantial encroachment on the
family. Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 204 & n.130. In addition, the court held that the statute
included adequate safeguards to protect the interests of all of the parties involved. Eddy, supra
note 123, at 207. The Herndon court stated:
Missouri's statute is reasonable both because it contemplates only a minimal intrusion
on the family relationship and because it is narrowly tailored to adequately protect the
interests of parents and children. The statute provides that a court may grant visitation
to a grandparent only if the grandparent has been unreasonably denied visitation for
more than ninety days. A court may grant visitation only if it will be in the best
interest of the child. If visitation would endanger the child physically, mentally, or
emotionally then visitation must be denied.
Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210.
148. Eddy, supra note 123, at 212.
149. Bohl, supra note 70, at 34-35.
150. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
151. Id. at 577. In Hawk, Bill and Sue Hawk petitioned for visitation with their grandchildren,
Megan and Steven Hawk. Id. at 576. The children and their parents, Bob and Bay Hawk, lived in
the same town as Bill and Sue Hawk. Id. at 575. Bill owned and operated a bowling alley where
Bob worked until 1989 when Bill fired Bob. Id. Until that time, Bob, his wife, and children often
spent time with his parents and the two families attended the same church. Id. Bay and Sue
bowled together and spent one afternoon a week together with the children. Id. Additionally, the
children often spent nights with their grandparents and the grandparents frequently babysat the
children. Id. Disputes arose between the couples over methods of disciplining the children, the
children's activities, and their bedtimes. Id. at 575-76. After Bob was fired, Bill's relationship
with his grandchildren was essentially terminated. Id. at 576. A few months later, after an
intense family argument, Sue also ended her relationship with her son and his family. Id. Bill
and Sue then sought court-ordered visitation with their grandchildren. Id.
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grandparent visitation statute that allowed grandparents to petition for
visitation when it was in the child's best interests. 152 The court in Hawk
applied strict scrutiny and held that the statute violated the right to
privacy in parenting decisions that was protected by the state
constitution, and, therefore, the statute was unconstitutional as applied
to married parents.153 The court explained that because parental rights
constitute a fundamental liberty interest, the state may not use its parens
patriae power in the absence of the threat of substantial harm to the
child. 154
Following the rationale in Hawk, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in
Brooks v. Parkerson,155 held that the Georgia grandparent visitation
statute was unconstitutional. 156 The Brooks court, however, did not
152. Nichols, supra note 142, at 1910. The court rejected the argument that the best interests
of the child was a sufficiently compelling state interest that could be sustained under a strict
scrutiny analysis. Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 205.
153. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 582. The court declared the statute unconstitutional under the Due
Process Clause of the Tennessee Constitution which is analogous to the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution. Nichols, supra note 142, at 1911. The court stated that:
Without finding that the parents were unfit or that a dissolving marriage between the
parents had brought the matter of child custody before the court, the court imposed its
own notion of the children's best interests over the shared opinion of these parents,
stripping them of their right to control in parenting decisions. We hold that.., the
Tennessee Constitution protects the privacy interest of these parents in their child-
rearing decisions, so long as their decisions do not substantially endanger the welfare
of their children. Absent some harm to the child, we find that the state lacks a
sufficiently compelling justification for interfering with this fundamental right. When
applied to married parents who have maintained continuous custody of their children
and have acted as fit parents, we conclude that court interference ... constitutes an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy rights under the Tennessee Constitution.
Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 582.
154. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 579-80. The court explained:
[W]hen no substantial harm threatens a child's welfare, the state lacks a sufficiently
compelling justification for the infringement on the fundamental right of parents to
raise their children as they see fit. Thus, we find the statute to be unconstitutional
under... the Tennessee Constitution, as applied to this married couple, whose fitness
as parents is unchallenged.
Id. at 577. In reaching this conclusion the court noted that in the context of other family law
issues the state has a bifurcated system. Joan Catherine Bohl, Grandparent Visitation Law Grows
Up: The Trend Toward Awarding Visitation Only When the Child Would Otherwise Suffer Harm,
48 DRAKE L. REv. 279, 288 (2000). This means that in matters resulting in an intrusion on
family life, there must be a finding of harm or threat of harm to the child, before an analysis of
the best interests of the child can take place. Id. The court then concluded that this same
bifurcated system must be utilized in the context of grandparent visitation. Id. at 288-89.
155. Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769 (Ga. 1995).
156. Id. at 773-74. In Brooks, Ms. Parkerson, the child's maternal grandmother, filed for
visitation. Id. at 770. The petition was opposed by Stacy and William Brooks, the child's
parents, who challenged the constitutionality of the statute. Id. The Georgia statute stated that
"the court may grant any grandparent of the child reasonable visitation rights upon proof of
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explicitly limit its holding to situations involving children whose
parents were married. 1
57
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Facts
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel never married; Tommie,
however, gave birth to two daughters, Isabelle and Natalie.'58 After
Tommie and Brad separated in 1991, Brad moved in with his parents,
Jenifer and Gary Troxel. 159 Brad regularly brought his daughters to his
parents' house for weekend visits until he died in May 1993.'60 After
Brad's death, the Troxels continued to see their granddaughters on a
regular basis, but the girls did not stay overnight with the Troxels. 16 1 In
October 1993, however, Granville informed the Troxels that she wished
to limit their visitation with the girls to one short visit each month. 162
The Troxels were dissatisfied with Granville's limit on their visitation
and, therefore, did not see their grandchildren between October and
special circumstances which make such visitation rights necessary to the best interests of the
child." Id. at 771.
157. Nichols, supra note 142, at 1912. The court focused on cases such as Meyer, Pierce, and
Yoder and stated that the United States Supreme Court has long recognized the constitutionally
protected right of parents to raise their children free from state interference. Brooks, 454 S.E.2d
at 771-72. The court continued by stating that the United States Supreme Court has made clear
that the state may only interfere in the parent-child relationship under certain circumstances. Id.
at 772. These circumstances include when the state acts in its police power to protect the child's
health or welfare and in situations where the parental decision would result in harm to the child.
Id. Consequently, the Brooks court applied strict scrutiny. Id. at 773-74 & n.6 (explaining that
the dissent incorrectly argues that rational basis review should have been applied); see also
Whitehouse, supra note 15, at 205 (stating that the court applied strict scrutiny). The court held
that the statute was unconstitutional under both the Georgia and the United States Constitutions
because it did not clearly promote the health and welfare of the child and did not require a finding
that the child would be harmed absent visitation as a condition precedent to granting visitation.
Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 774. The court held that:
[T]he state may only impose.., visitation over the parents' objections on a showing
that failing to do so would be harmful to the child. It is irrelevant, to this constitutional
analysis, that it might, in many instances be "better" or "desirable" for a child to
maintain contact with a grandparent. The statute in question is unconstitutional under
both the state and federal constitutions because it does not clearly promote the health or
welfare of the child and does not require a showing of harm before state interference is
authorized.
Id. at 773-74.
158. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2057 (2000) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
159. id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
160. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
161. In re Troxel, 940 P.2d 698, 699 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997), aff'd in part sub nom. In re
Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (Wash. 1998).
162. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2057 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
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December 1993.163 The Troxels commenced their lawsuit in December
1993 pursuant to the "open ended" Washington statute that permitted
any person to assert visitation rights with a child as long as visitation
would serve the best interests of the child.' 64
When the trial began in December 1994, Natalie and Isabelle were
five and almost three years old, respectively.' 65 At trial, the Troxels
requested visitation with the girls consisting of two weekends of
overnight visits per month and two weeks during each summer. 166
Granville did not object to visitation altogether but asked the court to
grant visitation of one day per month with no overnight stay. 167  The
superior court entered a decree ordering visitation one weekend per
month, one week each summer, and four hours on the grandparents'
birthdays. 168
Granville appealed during which time she married Kelly Wynn. 169
Granville's new husband adopted the girls in February 1996.170 The
Washington Court of Appeals initially remanded the case to the superior
court because that court had failed to provide written findings of fact
and conclusions of law to support its grant of visitation. 71 On remand,
the superior court found that visitation was in the best interests of the
girls since the Troxels were part of a large, loving family and could
provide "cousins and music" for their grandchildren.172
163. Troxel, 940 P.2d at 699.
164. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2057-58 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). The Washington state
statute at issue stated that "[a]ny person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time
including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any
person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any
change of circumstances." Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (2000)).
165. Troxel, 940 P.2d at 699.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 23 (Wash. 1998), aff'd in part sub nom. Troxel v. Granville,
120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
170. Id.
171. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2058 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
172. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). The Court found:
The Petitioners [the Troxels] are part of a large, central, loving family, all located in
this area, and the Petitioners can provide opportunities for the children in the areas of
cousins and music .... The court took into consideration all factors regarding the best
interest of the children and considered all the testimony before it. The children would
be benefitted from spending quality time with the Petitioners, provided that that time is
balanced with time with the childrens' [sic] nuclear family. The court finds that the
childrens' [sic] best interests are served by spending time with their mother and
stepfather's other six children.
Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
986 [Vol. 32
Troxel v. Granville
B. The State Appellate Court Decision
The Washington Court of Appeals dismissed the Troxel's petition for
visitation after holding that nonparents lacked standing to seek visitation
absent a pending custody action. 173 The court discussed several reasons
for this conclusion. 174 The court started by discussing the standing
requirement and stated that a literal reading of the Washington statute
allowing any person to petition for visitation would lead to an absurd
result. 175  The court explained that limiting nonparental visitation
petitions to circumstances under which a custody action was pending
was consistent with the constitutional restrictions on interference with
parents' fundamental liberty interests in the care, custody, and control
of their children. 176
Next, the court examined the statutory history of two provisions
allowing nonparents to petition for visitation. 177 The first statute is
located in the dissolution of marriage and legal separation section of the
Washington Code ("Dissolution Statute"). 178  The second statute is
located in the nonparental actions for child custody section of the
Washington Code and is the statute pursuant to which the Troxels
initiated their lawsuit ("Nonparent Custody Statute"). 179
In 1987, the legislature enacted these two virtually identical
provisions. 180  In 1996, however, the Legislature amended the
Dissolution Statute to limit the circumstances under which a nonparent
may petition for visitation. 18 1 These circumstances include situations
where a custody action initiated by a parent is pending and where the
petitioner can demonstrate a significant relationship exists with the child
with whom visitation is sought. 82 The court could not find any reason
why the Legislature would amend the Dissolution Statute and not the
Nonparent Custody Statute, and concluded that the failure to amend the
latter statute must have been due to an unintentional oversight. 83 The
court concluded, therefore, that a petition for visitation under the
173. Troxel, 940 P.2d at 699-701.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 699-700 (stating that "[olur Legislature could not have intended such an absurd and
potentially pernicious result from so broad a reading of the statute").
176. Id. at 700 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
177. Id. at 699-700.
178. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.240 (2000).
179. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (2000).
180. Troxel, 940 P.2d at 700.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 700-01.
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Nonparent Custody Statute must be contemporaneous with a proceeding
for child custody.' 84 Having resolved the issue on statutory grounds,
the Washington Court of Appeals did not address Granville's
constitutional challenge to the statute. 185
C. The Washington Supreme Court Decision
The Washington Supreme Court held that the plain language of the
statute gave the Troxels standing to seek visitation rights. 186 The court,
however, then cited Meyer v. Nebraska and its progeny and stated that
parents have a fundamental right to control the upbringing of their
children. 187  The court dismissed the petitioners contention that a
finding that visitation would be in the best interests of a child would be
a sufficiently compelling justification to override parents' opposition to
visitation. 188 The court reasoned that the holdings in Meyer, Pierce, and
Yoder indicate that the state may only interfere in parents' rights to raise
their children in order to prevent harm to a child. 189 The court stated
that Washington had followed suit by allowing the state to interfere in
184. Id. at 701.
185. Id.
186. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 24 (Wash. 1998). The Supreme Court of Washington
consolidated the Troxels' case with two other cases involving Washington's visitation statute. Id.
at 23. The court stated that:
By its plain language, RCW 26.10.160(3) gives nonparents an avenue to obtain
visitation rights with children outside of a custody proceeding. We decline to construe
the language of RCW 26.10.160(3) because we find that the language of the statute is
unambiguous. Further, we will not read qualifications into the statute which are not
there. A "court cannot read into a statute that which it may believe the legislature has
omitted, be it an intentional or inadvertent omission."
Id. at 26 (quoting Auto. Drivers & Demonstrators Union Local 882 v. Dep't of Retirement Sys.,
598 P.2d 379 (1979)).
187. Id. at 27. The court held that "it is undisputed that parents have a fundamental right to
autonomy in child rearing decisions." Id. The court went on to state that:
A parent's constitutionally protected right to rear his or her children without state
interference, has been recognized as a fundamental "liberty" interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment and also as a fundamental right derived from the privacy rights
inherent in the constitution. Where a fundamental right is involved, state interference
is justified only if the state can show that it has a compelling interest and such
interference is narrowly drawn to meet only the compelling state interest involved.
Id. at 28.
188. Id. at 29. "Petitioners contend that a judicially determined finding that visitation is in the
best interests of the child is a sufficiently compelling justification to override a parent's
opposition, regardless of the fact that the parent's fitness is not challenged or that there has been
no showing of harm or threatened harm to the child." Id.
189. Id. The court stated that "the Supreme Court cases which support the constitutional right
to rear one's child and the right to family privacy indicate that the state may interfere only 'if it
appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential
for significant social burdens."' Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972)).
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the parent-child relationship only to prevent harm or the risk of harm to
the child. 19° The court held that in this case there was no such
compelling state interest. 191 According to the Washington Supreme
Court, the statute was also overly broad in allowing "any person" to
petition for visitation at "any time" as long as it would be in the child's
best interests. 192  The court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the
court of appeals. 1
93
D. The United States Supreme Court Decision
On June 5, 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided Troxel v.
Granville'94 in a plurality decision. 195 Justice O'Connor, writing for the
plurality, limited the Court's holding to the Washington statute as
applied to the facts of the case and concluded that the visitation order
was an unconstitutional intrusion on Granville's fundamental rights as a
parent. 196  Justice Souter and Justice Thomas filed concurring
190. Id. "This court has emphasized that a state can only intrude upon a family's integrity
pursuant to its parens patriae right when 'parental actions or decisions seriously conflict with the
physical or mental health of the child."' id. (quoting In re Welfare of Sumey, 94 Wash. 2d 757,
762 (1980)).
191. Id. at 30.
192. Id. In addition, the court noted that there was no requirement that the petitioner have a
substantial relationship with the child nor did the court need to take into consideration factors
such as the parents' reasons for restricting visitation. Id. at 31.
193. Id. at 31. The court stated that:
We recognize that in certain circumstances where a child has enjoyed a substantial
relationship with a third person, arbitrarily depriving the child of the relationship could
cause severe psychological harm to the child. The difficulty, however, is that such a
standard is not required in RCW 26.10.160(3) .... There is no threshold requirement
of a finding of harm to the child as a result of the discontinuation of visitation.
Id. at 30. The court continued by stating:
Short of preventing harm to the child, the standard of "best interest of the child" is
insufficient to serve as a compelling state interest overruling a parent's fundamental
rights. State intervention to better a child's quality of life through third party visitation
is not justified where the child's circumstances are otherwise satisfactory. To suggest
otherwise would be the logical equivalent to asserting that the state has the authority to
break up stable families and redistribute its infant population to provide each child with
the "best family." It is not within the province of the state to make significant
decisions concerning the custody of children merely because it could make a "better"
decision.
Id. at 30-31. The dissent argued that the holding was based on two flawed premises. Id. at 32.
First, that parents' fundamental liberty interests in raising their children is beyond regulation. Id.
Second, that the state may not use its power as parens patriae unless there is a finding of harm to
the child. Id.
194. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
195. Id.
196. See infra Part HI.D. I (discussing Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion).
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opinions.' 97 Justice Souter stated that the statute was facially invalid
and that the holding need not be limited to the facts of the case. 198
Justice Thomas noted, in his concurring opinion, that parental rights are
unenumerated and that the original understanding of the Due Process
Clause precluded judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights. 199
Justice Thomas acknowledged, however, that the Supreme Court had
previously recognized a fundamental right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children, and, therefore, he concurred in the
result. 20
0
Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy filed dissenting opinions.2
0
'
Justice Stevens stated that the Court should have considered not only
the interests of the parents and the state but also the interests of the
children. 20 2 He argued that children have a fundamental liberty interest
in preserving bonds with nonparents. 20 3 In a second dissenting opinion,
Justice Scalia stated that the right of parents to raise their children free
from state interference is unenumerated, and, therefore, the Constitution
did not give judges any right to invalidate the statute.204 Finally, in a
third dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy made clear that a
consideration of whether visitation would be in the child's best interests
was appropriate even without a determination that the child would
suffer harm if visitation was not granted.2 °5
1. Justice O'Connor's Plurality Opinion
In a plurality decision, 20 6 the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court. 20 7  Writing for the
plurality, Justice O'Connor did not explicitly hold that Washington's
visitation statute was unconstitutional.2 8 Instead, Justice O'Connor
limited the Court's holding to the Washington statute as applied to the
197. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2057.
198. Infra Part IlI.D.2 (discussing Justice Souter's concurring opinion).
199. Infra Part I1l.D.3 (discussing Justice Thomas' concurring opinion).
200. Infra Part Ill.D.3 (discussing Justice Thomas' concurring opinion).
201. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2057.
202. Infra Part 11I.D.4 (discussing Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion).
203. Infra Part IlI.D.4 (discussing Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion).
204. Infra Part II.D.5 (discussing Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion).
205. Infra Part III.D.6 (discussing Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion).
206. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice
Breyer. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2057-65. Justice Souter, id. at 2065-67, and Justice Thomas, id. at
2067-68, each wrote concurring opinions. Justice Stevens, id. at 2068-74, Justice Scalia, id. at
2074-75, and Justice Kennedy, id. at 2075-79, each wrote dissenting opinions.
207. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2059 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
208. See id. at 2064-65 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); Schepard, supra note 55, at 3.
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facts of the case.209  The Justice began by addressing the idea that in
addition to procedural protection, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides a substantive component that protects
against governmental interference with certain fundamental rights and
liberty interests. 210  The plurality stated that parents' liberty interests in
the care, custody, and control of their children at issue in this case is one
of the oldest fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme
Court.211 After looking to such precedent as Meyer, Pierce, Yoder, and
Prince, the plurality concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of this fundamental right of parents cannot be doubted.212
Justice O'Connor declared the statute to be "breathtakingly broad"
since the language of the statute effectively allowed any person to
subject a decision made by parents about visitation to state-court
review. 213  She stated that the Washington statute did not require that
the court give the parents' decision any presumption of validity or
weight whatsoever, but instead it placed the best interest determination
solely in the hands of the judge.214
Justice O'Connor pointed to several factors that compelled the
conclusion that the statute violated the Due Process Clause, as applied
to this case. 215 First, the Troxel grandparents did not assert, and no
lower court had determined, that Tommie Granville was unfit as a
parent.216 The Court stated that there is a presumption that fit parents
make decisions based on their children's best interests. 217  Second, the
209. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2064-65 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion); Weiss, supra note 26, at
1118. Justice O'Connor stated "we hold that § 26.10.160(3), as applied in this case, is
unconstitutional." Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2064 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
210. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2059-60 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)) (stating that the court has "long recognized that the
Amendment's Due Process Clause . . . 'guarantees more than fair process.' The Clause also
includes a substantive component that 'provides heightened protection against governmental
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests"').
211. Id. at 2060 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
212. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
213. Id. at 2061 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
214. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). "[I1n the State of Washington a court can disregard
and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning visitation whenever a third party
affected by the decision files a visitation petition, based solely on the judge's determination of the
child's best interests." Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
215. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
216. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
217. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). To support this proposition, the Court cited to
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). In Parham, the Court
noted that historically the law has "recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act
in the best interests of their children." Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. This presumption, that the law
accepts as a starting point, is based on "pages of human experience that teach that parents
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Washington Superior Court gave no special weight to Granville's
determination of what was in her daughters' best interests. 2 18  The
plurality asserted that courts must accord at least some special weight to
the decisions made by parents. 219 Finally, Justice O'Connor noted that
there was no allegation that Granville ever sought to cut off visitation
with the Troxels entirely. 220  Granville did not oppose visitation
altogether, she simply objected to the amount of visitation requested by
the Troxels.22
1
The plurality concluded that, based on the sweeping breadth of the
statute and its application in this case, the visitation order was an
unconstitutional intrusion into Granville's fundamental right to make
decisions about the care, custody, and control of her two daughters. 222
The plurality, therefore, chose not to consider whether the Due Process
Clause requires nonparental visitation statutes to include, as a condition
precedent, a determination that the denial of visitation would cause
harm to the child before visitation can be granted.223 The plurality
expressly stated that the Court, through this decision, was not defining
the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation
context and that the Court would be reluctant to hold that a state's
nonparent visitation statute was a per se violation of the Due Process
Clause.
224
generally do act in the child's best interest." Id. at 602-03.
218. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2062 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). The plurality believed that
the superior court had, in fact, applied the opposite presumption. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion). Based on the oral ruling pronounced by the superior court judge after the conclusion of
the closing arguments, the plurality stated that the judge's comments suggested that "he presumed
the grandparents' request should be granted unless the children would be 'impact[ed] adversely."'
Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). The plurality believed that "the judge placed on Granville,
the fit custodial parent, the burden of disproving that visitation would be in the best interest of her
daughters." Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). This contradicted the traditional presumption
that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
219. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
220. Id. at 2062-63 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
221. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
222. Id. at 2063-64 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor stated that this case
involved a simple disagreement between the Washington Superior Court and Granville about
what was best for her daughters. Id. at 2063 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor
explained that "the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental
right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a 'better'
decision could be made." Id. at 2064 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
223. Id. at 2064 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
224. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). The plurality opinion stated that the Court "would
be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a
per se matter." Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
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2. Justice Souter's Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter stated that he would have
affirmed the Washington Supreme Court's facial invalidation of its own
statute and would not have elaborated on that decision. 225 He stated that
the statute was unconstitutional in authorizing courts to grant visitation
to any person, at any time, and that the holding need not be limited to
the statute's specific application to the facts of the case.226  Justice
Souter believed that the Washington Supreme Court's invalidation of
the statute rested on two independently sufficient grounds: the failure of
the statute to require a condition precedent of harm to the child before
visitation could be ordered, and the statute's authorization that any
person could petition for visitation at any time, as long as it was in the
child's best interests. 227 He stated that the fact that the statute was too
broad was sufficient to invalidate the statute on its face.228 Therefore,
there was no need to determine whether there must be a finding that a
denial of visitation would cause harm to the child or to consider the
precise scope of parents' rights and the necessary protections for those
rights. 229
Justice Souter cited the line of United States Supreme Court cases
that have recognized parents' liberty interest in the "nurture, upbringing,
companionship, care, and custody of children ... ."230 The Justice
acknowledged that the Supreme Court cases have "not set out exact
metes and bounds" to the parents' protected interests. 231  He stated,
however, that "Meyer's repeatedly recognized right of upbringing
would be a sham" if it did not include the right to be free from judicially
ordered visitation every time a judge believed that the parent had not
made the best decision. 232
225. Id. at 2065 (Souter, J., concurring).
226. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
227. Id. at 2065-66 (Souter, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 2066 (Souter, J., concurring).
229. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
230. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (citing cases including Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972), Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923)).
231. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 2066-67 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter wrote:
It would be anomalous, then, to subject a parent to any individual judge's choice of a
child's associates from out of the general population merely because the judge might
think himself more enlightened than the child's parent. To say the least (and as the
Court implied in Pierce), parental choice in such matters is not merely a default rule in
the absence of either governmental choice or the government's designation of an
official with the power to choose for whatever reason and in whatever circumstances.
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3. Justice Thomas' Concurring Opinion
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Thomas noted that parental
rights are unenumerated 233 and that the original understanding of the
Due Process Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated
rights.234 Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality, however, that the
Supreme Court previously recognized parents' fundamental rights in
controlling the upbringing of their children. 235  He continued by
addressing the fact that strict scrutiny was the appropriate test for
examining infringements of fundamental rights.236 Moreover, he stated
that in this case the State of Washington lacked even a legitimate
government interest, let alone a compelling one, in interfering with a fit
parent's decision regarding visitation.237  Justice Thomas, therefore,
concluded that the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court should
be affirmed.238
4. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the Court would
have been wisest to deny certiorari. 239 Having granted certiorari,
however, Justice Stevens believed the Court should have addressed the
fact that the Washington Supreme Court held a state statute invalid on
its face based on a federal constitutional judgment. 240 The Justice
maintained that the statute was not made unconstitutional either by the
fact that it could be invoked by too many plaintiffs or because there was
the possibility that an individual could be granted visitation with a child
Id. at 2067 (Souter, J., concurring).
233. Unenumerated rights are rights that are not mentioned specifically or, in other words, not
expressly named or granted. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (6th ed. 1990).
234. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2067 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas explained his
position:
I write separately to note that neither party has argued that our substantive due process
cases were wrongly decided and that the original understanding of the Due Process
Clause precludes judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights under that constitutional
provision. As a result, I express no view on the merits of this matter ....
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
235. Id. at 2068 (Thomas, J., concurring).
236. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
237. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
238. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 2068 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He wrote, "[gliven the problematic character of the
trial court's decision and the uniqueness of the Washington statute, there was no pressing need to
review a State Supreme Court decision that merely requires the state legislature to draft a better
statute." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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without proving that harm to the child would result if visitation did not
occur.
2 4 1
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Souter that the Court's conclusion
that the statute violated the Due Process Clause only as applied to the
facts of this case was unsound.242 As Justice Stevens read the
Washington Supreme Court opinion, its interpretation of the United
States Constitution rendered it unnecessary for the Washington
Supreme Court to definitively interpret the statute or to determine
whether the statute had been correctly applied to the Troxels' case.
243
Therefore, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should have instead
identified and corrected the two flaws in the Washington Supreme
Court's decision and remanded the case for further review of the
Superior Court's decision. 244
Justice Stevens posited that the Washington Supreme Court erred in
its federal constitutional analysis because neither the provision granting
any person visitation nor the absence of the requirement that there be a
finding that the child would be harmed prior to granting visitation
invalidated the statute in all instances.245 According to Justice Stevens,
a facial challenge to a statute should fail whenever a statute has a
"plainly legitimate sweep." 246 According to Justice Stevens, one flaw in
the Washington Supreme Court's decision was that there are numerous
cases in which the person seeking visitation would be a "once-custodial
caregiver, an intimate relation, or even a genetic parent." 247 He stated
that even the majority of the Justices on the Court would agree that in
241. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 2069 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In particular, Justice Stevens noted that the state
court gave no content to the phrase "best interest of the child." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens commented that meaning could have been given to the phrase based on
Washington's other statutes and decisions and the myriad other state statutes utilizing that
standard. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens added that the "best interests of the child"
appeared in at least ten current Washington statutes. Id. at 2069 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In
addition, Justice Stevens noted that a search of current state custody and visitation law revealed
698 different references to the "best interest of the child" standard, a number that "at a minimum,
should give the Court some pause before it upholds a decision implying that those words, on their
face, may be too boundless to pass muster under the Federal Constitution." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
244. Id. at 2070 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 740 n.7
(1997) (Stevens, J., concurring)). Justice Stevens explained that since the statute "plainly sweeps
in a great deal" of permissible cases in which visitation might be granted, the facial challenge to
the statute must fail. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
247. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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many circumstances granting visitation would be appropriate. 248 Justice
Stevens argued that another flaw in the Washington Supreme Court's
decision was that there was no support in the case law for the
proposition that the Federal Constitution requires a finding of harm or
potential harm to a child before a court may grant visitation over
parents' objections. 249  Justice Stevens stated that parents' liberty
interests have never been held to be a rigid shield that protects all
parental decisions from state intervention. 250
Justice Stevens then stated that cases like Troxel do not merely entail
a weighing of the interests of the parents and the state, but at minimum,
must also include a consideration of the interests of the child 1.25  The
Justice agreed that prior Supreme Court cases have made it clear that
parents have a fundamental liberty interest in child rearing and have a
privacy interest in doing so without undue interference from
strangers. 252 Furthermore, Justice Stevens acknowledged that the Court
has not yet had occasion to elucidate the nature of children's liberty
interests in preserving family or family-like bonds.253  He stated,
however, that it appeared extremely likely that children, as well as
248. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 2071 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that "we have never held that
the parent's liberty interest in this relationship is so inflexible as to establish a rigid constitutional
shield, protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent a threshold finding
of harm." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 2071 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that "[clases like this do
not present a bipolar struggle between parents and the State over who has final authority to
determine what is in a child's best interests. There is at a minimum a third individual, whose
interests are implicated in every case to which the statute applies-the child." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The Justice went on to explain the balancing of interests that must occur:
A parent's rights with respect to her child have ... never been regarded as absolute,
but rather are limited by the existence of an actual, developed relationship with a child,
and are tied to the presence or absence of some embodiment of family.... [A] parent's
interest in a child must be balanced against the State's long-recognized interests as
parens patriae, and, critically, the child's own complementary interest in preserving
relationships that serve her welfare and protection.
Id. at 2072 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
252. Id. at 2071 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 2072 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court has acknowledged that children have
fights and liberties that are protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 643-44 (1979) (declaring that a state cannot unconstitutionally burden the right of a minor to
obtain an abortion); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (stating that children have a
substantial liberty interest in not being involuntarily confined); Planned Parenthood of Central
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (reiterating that minors, as well as adults, are protected
by the Constitution and have constitutional rights); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist. 393
U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969) (holding that children have a First Amendment right to political speech);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (finding that children have due process rights in criminal
trials).
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parents, have fundamental liberty interests in preserving intimate
relationships that must be balanced into the equation. 254 Justice Stevens
concluded that it is clear that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides room for states to consider the impact on a child
of possibly arbitrary parental decisions that do not serve the best
interests of the child.25
5
5. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia stated that he agreed
that parents have a right to raise their children free from state
interference. 256  Because, however, that right is unenumerated, Justice
Scalia explained that, in his interpretation, the Constitution gave judges
no right to invalidate the statute. 257 In addition, based on the diversity
of opinions concerning parental rights, Justice Scalia stated that the
theory of unenumerated parental rights had little claim to stare decisis
protection. 258 He stated that while Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder should not
254. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2072 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that "[a]t a
minimum, our prior cases recognizing that children are, generally speaking, constitutionally
protected actors require that this Court reject any suggestion that when it comes to parental rights,
children are so much chattel." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Parental rights are not absolute and
the "constitutional protection against arbitrary state interference with parental rights should not be
extended to prevent the States from protecting children against the arbitrary exercise of parental
authority that is not in fact motivated by an interest in the welfare of the child." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens explained the importance of considering children's interests:
[W]e should recognize that there may be circumstances in which a child has a stronger
interest at stake than mere protection from serious harm caused by the termination of
visitation by a "person" other than a parent. The almost infinite variety of family
relationships that pervade our ever-changing society strongly counsels against the
creation by this Court of a constitutional rule that treats a biological parent's liberty
interest in the care and supervision of her child as an isolated right that may be
exercised arbitrarily. It is indisputably the business of the States, rather than a federal
court emphasizing a national standard, to access in the first instance the relative
importance of the conflicting interests that give rise to disputes such as this.
Id. at 2073 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 2074 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia explained that:
[W]hile I would think it entirely compatible with the commitment to representative
democracy set forth in the founding documents to argue, in legislative chambers or in
electoral campaigns, that the state has no power to interfere with parents' authority
over the rearing of their children, I do not believe that the power which the
Constitution confers upon me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to laws that (in
my view) infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated right.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
be overruled, neither should the holdings be extended to reach this new
context.
259
6. Justice Kennedy's Dissenting Opinion
In a third dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy focused on the
Washington Supreme Court's conclusion that the statute was flawed
because it allowed visitation by a third party, without first finding that
the child would be harmed if visitation was denied. 260 The Justice
criticized this holding because the theory behind the holding was "too
broad to be correct."261  Justice Kennedy stated that the holding
appeared to contemplate that the best interests of the child standard was
unconstitutional in all third-party visitation cases and that the state
supreme court required a finding that harm to the child would result if
visitation was withheld.262 The Justice made clear that a determination
that the child will suffer harm if visitation is not granted is unnecessary
in every case where a third party is seeking visitation with a child.263
Justice Kennedy analyzed the Washington Supreme Court's
requirement that, prior to granting visitation, a determination must be
made that the child will suffer harm if visitation is not granted.
264
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that parents have a constitutionally
protected right to raise their children, the precise scope of which is
unclear and explained that the state supreme court attempted to give
content to this parental right by requiring a threshold finding of harm to
the child.265 He pointed out that while the Court has acknowledged that
259. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia elaborated on his concern:
If we embrace this unenumerated right... we will be ushering in a new regime of
judicially prescribed, and federally prescribed, family law. I have no reason to believe
that federal judges will be better at this than state legislatures; and state legislatures
have the great advantage of doing harm in a more circumscribed area, of being able to
correct their mistakes in a flash, and of being removable by the people.
Id. at 2074-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 2075 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
261. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
262. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the possibility existed
that visitation cases would arise where the best interests of the child standard would not provide
sufficient protection to parents' constitutional rights to raise their children without state
interference. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He argued, however, that this is quite different than
saying that harm to the child is required in every case. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 2077 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy also mentioned that the state
supreme court had found the statute flawed in allowing any person to seek visitation at any time,
but he stated that the state supreme court's judgment should be vacated and remanded on the sole
ground that the requirement of harm to the child was error because of its broad formulation. Id. at
2076 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
264. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
265. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy pointed out that "it might be argued as an
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states have the authority to intervene to prevent harm to the child, this is
not the same as requiring a heightened "harm to the child" standard in
every third-party visitation case.266  According to Justice Kennedy, the
state supreme court's holding that the Constitution forbids the
application of the best interests of the child standard in any visitation
proceeding appears to rest on assumptions not required by the
Constitution.
267
Justice Kennedy stressed that he was concerned that the state
supreme court's holding was based on the assumption that children
were from a conventional nuclear family, that the parent resisting
visitation had always been the children's primary caregiver, and that the
person seeking visitation had no legitimate relationship with the
children. 268 The Justice pointed out that for many children a traditional
family is "simply not the reality of their childhood.- 2
69
Justice Kennedy stated that he did not believe that there was any right
to be free from courts utilizing the best interests standard. 270  He
explained that the best interests standard is widely used and has been
recognized for many years. 271 The Justice argued that the extensive use
of the best interests standard should give courts pause before rejecting
the standard in all third-party visitation cases, as the Washington
Supreme Court had done.272 He argued that a more appropriate
approach would be to determine whether the best interests standard is
appropriate based on the specific facts of a particular case. 273 Based on
abstract matter that in some sense the child is always harmed if his or her best interests are not
considered . I..." d. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 2077 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
267. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
268. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
269. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 2079 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy declared that the best interests of
the child standard has been recognized for many years in visitation proceedings and therefore
courts should not be so quick to reject it, but should consider it as the Washington court did. Id.
at 2078 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Justice noted that all fifty states have enacted visitation
statutes and all except one of these statutes permit visitation to be granted in some circumstances
if it is found to be in the best interests of the child. Id. at 2079 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy stated that only Georgia has adopted a general harm to the child standard and it did so
only after its prior visitation statute was invalidated under the United States and Georgia
Constitutions. Id. at 2078 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Savage, supra note 25, at 38 (stating
that all states except Georgia have visitation laws that permit the court to authorize visitation if
the judge thinks it is in the best interests of the child); supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text
(discussing the Georgia case that struck the grandparent visitation statute down as
unconstitutional).
271. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2078 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
272. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 2079 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "[A] fit parent's right vis-a-vis a complete stranger
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these factors, Justice Kennedy concluded that the holding of the state
supreme court that the application of the best interests of the child
standard is always unconstitutional in third-party visitation cases should
have been reversed, the judgment should have been vacated, and the
case should have been remanded.274
IV. ANALYSIS
In an unusual foray into the area of family law, the Supreme Court
Justices divided sharply in this case. 275 Because the Court's opinion is
quite unhelpful, the Court might as well have continued its traditional
position of refusing to become involved in areas of family law.276
Troxel is an unhelpful opinion because there are three major problems
with the Court's approach. First, the Court should not have granted
certiorari.277 Second, the Court should have made clear that children
have constitutional rights that courts must protect when it is in the best
interests of the child to do so.278 Finally, the Supreme Court's decision
provides little guidance to the states, and leaves this area of law in as
much confusion as it was prior to the Troxel decision. 279
A. The Court Should Not Have Granted Certiorari in this Case
Prior to granting certiorari in Troxel, the Supreme Court had denied
review to cases involving third-party visitation. 280  While all fifty states
have third-party visitation statutes, Washington's statute is one of the
broadest, because it allows, over the objections of the parents, any
person to petition for visitation at any time. 281 Justice O'Connor was
is one thing; her right vis-a-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another." Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
274. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
275. Tony Mauro, Grandparent Visitation Law Struck Down, N.Y. L.J., June 6, 2000, at I.
276. Susan Nielsen, State's High Court Does Better with Grandparents' Rights, SEATrLE
TIMES, June 8, 2000, at B6.
277. See infra Part IV.A (arguing that the Supreme Court should not have granted certiorari in
this case).
278. See infra Part IV.B (stating that children have constitutional rights deserving of the
Court's protection).
279. See infra Part IV.C (examining why the Court's decision provides no guidance to state
courts and legislatures).
280. Strawman, supra note 33, at 35; see also Weiss, supra note 26, at 1118 (stating that by
granting certiorari in Troxel, the Supreme Court forayed into this area of family law).
281. Rebecca Porter, Supreme Court Delivers Narrow Ruling on Grandparents' Visitation
Rights, 36-AUG TRIAL 84; see also supra note 28 (listing grandparent and third-party visitation
statutes from all fifty states).
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correct in stating that the Washington statute was "breathtakingly
broad," however, most states' grandparent visitation statutes are much
more narrowly tailored.282 The statute, therefore, was not representative
of the statutes found in most other states. 283
The Court would have provided more guidance to state courts and
legislatures if it had granted certiorari in a case involving a statute that
was more representative of statutes in other states. 284 Had the Court
done so, it would have provided state courts with some idea of the
factors that must be examined in determining the constitutionality of a
third-party visitation statute, and it could have provided legislatures
with the direction that must be taken to draft statutes that will pass
constitutional muster.285  By granting certiorari in this case, however,
the Court afforded no guidance whatsoever to states whose statutes are
less broad than Washington's statute.2 86
B. Children Have Constitutional Rights Deserving of the Court's
Protection
The Supreme Court previously made clear that parents have a
fundamental liberty interest in the care, upbringing, and control of their
children. 287  In addition, it is beyond doubt that under some
282. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2061-63 (2000) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion); supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (explaining that some state statutes require an
initial showing of disruption to the family unit before a third party can petition for visitation and
some state statutes require that there must be a showing of harm prior to permitting a third party
to petition for visitation with a child).
283. See David N. Schaffer, State Law on Grandparent Visitation Needs Revision, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., June 20, 2000, at 6. "The Washington statute was an extreme example of a visitation
statute trampling on a parent's rights." Id.; see also supra Part II.C (examining the wide variety
of state grandparent visitation statutes).
284. See infra Parts IV.C, V (discussing the lack of guidance provided by the Troxel decision
and the disparate results in various states since the decision). Justice Stevens also stated that the
Court should not have granted certiorari in this case. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2068 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens' view was based on his belief that there was no need to review the
decision of the Washington Supreme Court that simply required the state legislature to draft a
better statute. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
285. See Sylvia Law, Rulings on Abortion and Grandparents' Visitation, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 7,
2000, at A26.
286. See infra Part V (discussing the continuing confusion and inconsistency in the
approaches of state courts since the Troxel decision). Even if the Court had taken a more
definitive position and held that the statute was unconstitutional on its face, as did the
Washington Supreme Court, it still would not have resolved the issues dividing the state courts.
See supra Part II.C (examining the various types of state grandparent visitation statutes).
287. See supra Part II.B (tracing the development of the concept that parents have a
fundamental liberty interest in raising their children).
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circumstances states will interfere in this fundamental liberty interest.288
The majority of the Justices on the Supreme Court viewed this case as a
balancing of the rights of parents to autonomously raise their children
against the rights of grandparents to seek visitation with their
grandchildren. 289 Most of the Justices did not consider children's rights
in their analysis which indicates that the Court undervalues children. 290
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects "all
persons" and this includes children. 29 1  The Court, therefore, should
have made clear that children have due process rights in preserving the
relationships they have formed with nonparents when it is in the
children's best interests to do so. 292 Sadly, Justice Stevens was the only
member of the Supreme Court to recognize that visitation cases involve
not only a weighing of the interests of the parents and the state, but in
addition, the interests of the child.293 As Justice Stevens stated, there is
a third individual, the child, whose interests are implicated in every case
involving a visitation statute. 294  It makes little sense to discuss the
competing interests of parents and grandparents, as the plurality opinion
did, without considering the implications to the child.295
The nature of the typical family has changed in the United States. 296
Today, many children are being raised in "nontraditional" families, and
288. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (making clear that parental autonomy is
not absolute and that under some circumstances the state will intervene in the parent-child
relationship); see also supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text (examining the United States
Supreme Court decision in Prince v. Massachusetts).
289. Judith Sperling-Newton et al., Protect Children's Rights, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2000, § 1,
at 10. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, for example, never suggested that children's interests
should be weighed into the decision of whether or not to grant visitation. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at
2057-67 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
290. Sperling-Newton et al., supra note 289, at 10.
291. Brief of Amicus Curiae Grandparents United for Children's Rights, Inc. at 5, Troxel (No.
99-0138); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
292. Brief of Amicus Curiae Grandparents United for Children's Rights, Inc. at 3-4, Troxel
(No. 99-0138).
293. Sperling-Newton et al., supra note 289, at 10. Justice Stevens stated that "[c]ases like
this do not present a bipolar struggle .... There is at a minimum a third individual, whose
interests are implicated in every case to which the statute applies-the child." Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at
2071 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
294. Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2071 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
295. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 32 (Wash. 1998) (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (stating that the
constitutional issue at stake "concerns the parameters and balancing of rights and interests of the
State and child, as well as those of the parents."); Sperling-Newton et al., supra note 289, at 10.
296. Sperling-Newton et al., supra note 289, at 10. In her plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor
acknowledged that the American family has changed significantly in the last century. Troxel, 120
S. Ct. at 2059 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). According to the statistics she cited, in 1996,
twenty-eight percent of all children under eighteen only lived with one parent. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion). In addition, in 1998, four million children under the age of eighteen lived in
2001] Troxel v. Granville 1003
the child rearing responsibilities have shifted to include the assistance of
grandparents, other relatives, and adults outside the family. 297  Children
form deep, loving bonds with these individuals. 298 Arbitrarily severing
the bond between a child and a loving caregiver will likely cause
psychological harm to that child. 299  The Supreme Court should have
recognized the child's right to maintain these relationships. 300 Any
parent who attempts to sever the relationship without justification is not
acting in the child's best interests, and, therefore, the parent's rights
must yield to the needs of the child.3°'
It is clear that the best interests of a child cannot be dispositive in
every case because parents also have interests deserving of
protection. 30 2  It is unnecessary, however, when deciding whether to
grant visitation to a third party that there be a finding that harm will
result to the child if visitation is not granted, prior to considering the
child's best interests. 303  Granting visitation to an individual does not
involve the same level of encroachment on parental rights as does, for
example, taking temporary custody of a child. 304  Therefore, the best
their grandparents' household. Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
297. Sperling-Newton et al., supra note 289, at 10.
298. Id.
299. Id. The term "psychological parent" has been used to describe the relationship that
develops between a child and an adult playing the role of the parent. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA
FREUD & ALBERT SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 19 (1973). Once a child
becomes bonded to the "psychological parent" severing the relationship is believed to be
extremely painful to the child. Id. at 19-20.
300. Sperling-Newton et al., supra note 289, at 10. "If society agrees that severing of a loving
bond between child and caregiver psychologically harms that child, why won't our nation's
highest Court acknowledge that a child, like the caregiver, has a constitutional right to continue
that relationship?" Id.
301. Schaffer, supra note 283, at 6.
If a child had a substantial relationship with a third party ... it may cause severe
psychological harm to arbitrarily sever that relationship. Any parent who so attempts
to sever or limit such a relationship, without good reason or good motivations, is not
acting within the best interests of the child. As such, an intrusion into the parent's
decision-making process would be constitutionally permissible.
Id.
302. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30-31 (Wash. 1998) (explaining that parents have a right to
raise their children free from state interference and state intervention simply to better a child's
quality of life when the child's life is otherwise satisfactory is not acceptable).
303. Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2076 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that
concerning the question of whether there is a requirement of a finding of harm before a
consideration of the best interests of the child "'[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices' do not give us clear or definitive answers" (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 721 (1997))).
304. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 208-09 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (stating that the
"magnitude of the infringement by the state is a significant consideration in determining whether
a statute will be struck down as unconstitutional" and that "visitation rights by grandparents ...
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interests of a child are appropriate interests to be weighed against the
rights of the parents, grandparents, and the state.30 5 It was shortsighted
of the Court not to make clear that children have rights worthy of
protection, even in the absence of harm, nor to recognize that children
have interests in maintaining relationships with nonparents that will be
protected.306 The Court should have taken this opportunity to elucidate
these rights30 7 and to make clear that a determination that the child will
suffer harm if visitation is not granted is unnecessary before the Court
can step in to protect these rights. 30 8  Until the Court recognizes that
children have constitutionally protected rights, it will continue to treat
children as chattel.3 °9 Children are not property, rather they are the
future of this nation, and, therefore, their rights must be protected.
310
are less than [a] substantial encroachment on a family"); Smith, 969 P.2d at 33 (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that terminating parental rights is an extreme abridgment of parental
rights, while awarding custody results in a relatively minor infringement).
305. See Smith, 969 P.2d at 33-35 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 38-39 (Talmadge, J., dissenting). Justice Talmadge explained the importance of
protecting the relationships children form with nonparents:
One of the frequent consequences, for children, of the decline of the traditional
nuclear family is the formation of close personal attachments between them and adults
outside of their immediate families. Stepparents, foster parents, grandparents and other
caretakers often form close bonds and, in effect, become psychological parents to
children whose nuclear families are not intact.
It would be shortsighted indeed, for this court not to recognize the realities and
complexities of modem family life, by holding today that a child has no rights, over the
objection of a parent, to maintain a close extra-parental relationship which has formed
in the absence of a nuclear family.
Id. (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
307. Sperling-Newton et al., supra note 289, at 10.
308. See Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2077 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 2072 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that "[a]t a minimum, our
prior cases recognizing that children are, generally speaking, constitutionally protected actors
require that this Court reject any suggestion that when it comes to parental rights, children are so
much chattel." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
310. Sperling-Newton et al., supra note 289, at 10.
[C]hildren are not property. They are our nation's future, and, as such, need our help
and protection. The best way to ensure that the rights of children are protected is to
recognize that children have constitutional rights to maintain important relationships.
Until our courts confirm these rights, sadly, Justice Stevens is correct in lamenting that
"children are just so much chattel."
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C. The Court's Decision Provides No Guidance to State Courts and
Legislatures
The Court took a middle ground in this case,311 thereby offending no
one. 312 Unfortunately, the standard for governmental interference with
parental rights remains extremely vague. 313 The plurality did not make
clear what factors are important to consider when determining whether
a visitation statute adequately protects parents' rights, and it did not
examine the important constitutional issues implicated in the case. 314 In
particular, the plurality left open one of the most divisive issues in this
area of the law. 315 The Supreme Court failed to decide whether a court
must first determine that the child would be harmed if visitation is
withheld before the court can consider whether visitation would be in
the child's best interests. 316  The standard, therefore, will remain
uncertain until the Supreme Court reviews another case involving a
third-party visitation statute and more directly confronts the issues
involved.317 Until then, state legislatures and courts will have to
continue to guess as to whether the state's visitation statute adequately
protects the rights of parents.318
The Court should have first made clear that a finding of harm is not
necessary to raise children's rights to a level deserving of protection. 319
311. Sam Skolnik, Case From Washington State Gives Parents Rights Over Visits; Treading a
Legal Minefield Over the Family, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 6, 2000, News, at AI
("They found a middle ground that recognized changes in the family while recognizing the role of
parents in raising their child without state interference.").
312. Nielsen, supra note 276, at B6. The AARP issued a statement stating that the "AARP is
gratified that the Supreme Court has proceeded cautiously in deciding this case. While the Court
invalidated the Washington visitation statute, it clearly left the door open for more narrowly
drawn grandparent visitation statutes .... " Press Release, AARP, AARP Issues Statement on
Supreme Court Ruling in Troxel Case (June 5, 2000) (on file with the author). A broad range of
other groups, including the Christian right and women's fights groups also praised the decision.
Mauro, supra note 275, at 1.
313. Nielsen, supra note 276, at B6.
314. Law, supra note 285, at A26.
315. Weiss, supra note 26, at 1131; supra Part II.C (explaining the inconsistent requirements
among states for granting visitation).
316. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2064 (2000) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
Writing for the plurality, Justice O'Connor stated:
[W]e do not consider.., whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental
visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a
condition precedent to granting visitation. We do not, and need not, define today the
precise scope of the parental due process fight in the visitation context.
Id. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
317. Nielsen, supra note 276, at B6.
318. Id.
319. See Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2077 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the Constitution
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Next, the Court should have articulated the best interests of the child
standard as the standard to be used when making decisions affecting
children. 320  In order to promote a level of uniformity, the Court could
have suggested factors to be considered in making a best interests of the
child determination. 321 The extreme diversity in American families and
the unique nature of each case, however, demands that states not require
mandatory consideration of certain factors. 322  Any list of factors,
therefore, should only be illustrative of the types of factors necessary to
adequately determine what is in the child's best interests. 323
V. IMPACT
After Troxel, most grandparent visitation statutes do not appear to be
in serious constitutional danger.324 Most Justices on the Court did not
want to invalidate these statutes on their face. 325  While most of the
Justices appear to believe that, at a minimum, parental decisions are
deserving of some deference, they did not endorse the position that the
constitutional protection of parental autonomy is inflexible or
insurmountable. 326  The Court's opinion indicated that states can
does not require a finding of harm to the child before the best interests of the child standard can
be applied).
320. Brief of Amicus Curiae Grandparents United for Children's Rights, Inc. at 8, Troxel (No.
99-0138). "The 'best interest of the child' standard should guide both the courts' and
legislatures' recognition of the constitutional rights of children as paramount." Id.
321. Id.
322. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21,40 (Wash. 1998) (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
323. Id. (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
324. Schepard, supra note 55, at 3. Contra All Things Considered: Supreme Court Decision
that Grandparents Can't Sue for Visits with Their Grandchildren (NPR radio broadcast, June 5,
2000). Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, a Law Professor from the University of Southern
California, stated:
I think that the practical effect of this will be to undermine grandparents' right statutes
that exist in all 50 states. It's certainly possible to interpret this decision narrowly, it's
just invalidating broad statues like Washington's; however, I think that the clear
implication of this is that parents have a fundamental right to control the upbringing of
their children and if parents don't want grandparent visitation, the state can't order it
over their objections.
All Things Considered, supra.
325. Schepard, supra note 55, at 3. Only Justice Souter explicitly stated that the Washington
statute was facially unconstitutional because the statute swept too broadly in allowing "any
person" at "any time" to petition for visitation subject only to the "free-ranging best-interests-of-
the-child standard." Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2066 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
326. Patricia M. Logue & Ruth Harlow, Court Sees Complexity in Choosing Between Legal
and De Facto Parents, N.J.L.J., June 19, 2000.
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override parents' decisions under some circumstances through carefully
drafted visitation statutes applied on a case-by-case basis.
327
In addition, no Justice on the Court explicitly endorsed a requirement
that harm to the child be found as the only route to state entrance in the
parent-child relationship. 328  Had the Court taken a more definitive
position and reached this conclusion, as did the Washington Supreme
Court, grandparent visitation would have been severely restricted.329
Finally, the Court made clear that its decision did not invalidate other
states' grandparent visitation statutes by restricting the holding to the
facts of the case. 33
0
The Supreme Court's decision in Troxel did not provide any
instruction to states as to the constitutionality of the state statutes.
331
Subsequent to the Court's decision in Troxel, many state courts have
examined the state's grandparent visitation statute.332  Since the
plurality restricted the opinion in Troxel to the facts of the case, the
confusion that plagued state courts prior to the Troxel decision
continues to create divergent opinions. 333 The Troxel opinion simply
327. Schepard, supra note 55, at 3.
328. Logue & Harlow, supra note 326. "[N]o justice embraced a showing of harm as the only
route to state intervention. The possibility was reserved by some justices and dismissed by
others." Id.
329. In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (Wash. 1998).
Short of preventing harm to the child, the standard of "best interest of the child" is
insufficient to serve as a compelling state interest overruling a parent's fundamental
rights. State intervention to better a child's quality of life through third party visitation
is not justified where the child's circumstances are otherwise satisfactory.
Id.
330. Mary E. O'Connell, The 'Troxel' Tightrope, NAT'L L.J., June 26, 2000, at A20.
331. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the lack of guidance provided by the Troxel decision).
332. See, e.g., Jackson v. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the
Arizona grandparent visitation statute is constitutional); Kyle 0. v. Donald R., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d
476 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the California statute allowing certain relatives to petition
for visitation with children was unconstitutional as applied in this case); Rideout v. Riendeau, 761
A.2d 291 (Me. 2000) (determining that the state grandparent visitation statute did not violate the
Due Process Clause); Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding that the
New York grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' substantive due process rights);
Fitzpatrick v. Youngs, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000) (concluding that the New York
visitation statute was constitutional); Neal v. Nesvold, 2000 OK 90, 14 P.3d 547 (Okla. 2000)
(holding that under the Oklahoma Constitution grandparent visitation can only be granted if the
child would be harmed if visitation was not granted).
333. See, e.g., Jackson, 18 P.3d at 107-08 (holding that the Arizona grandparent visitation is
constitutional); Kyle 0., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 485-87 (stating that the California statute allowing
certain relatives to petition for visitation with children was unconstitutional as applied in this
case); Rideout, 761 A.2d at 301-04 (determining that the state grandparent visitation statute did
not violate the Due Process Clause); Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 498-500 (holding that the New York
grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' substantive due process rights); Fitzpatrick,
717 N.Y.S.2d at 506-07 (concluding that the New York visitation statute was constitutional);
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provided no guidance to state courts and legislatures to aid in navigating
through this area of the law.3
34
Quite understandably, state courts examining the state's grandparent
visitation statute in light of Troxel have reached different decisions. 335
For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine examined its state
visitation act and determined it did not violate the Due Process
Clause.336 After reviewing Troxel, the court concluded that, as applied
to the facts of the case, the state statute was narrowly tailored to serve
the state's compelling interest and, therefore, could be applied without
violating the constitutional rights of the parents. 337 By comparison, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that under Troxel, the state's
grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' federal constitutional
rights to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their
children. 338 This holding was based on the fact that no court found that
the parents were unfit or that the children would suffer harm if court-
ordered grandparent visitation was not granted.339
Not only have different states reached different conclusions, even
courts within the same state, examining the same statute, have reached
different conclusions. 340 A New York Family Court examined the state
Neal, 2000 OK 90, 5-13, 14 P.3d at 549-51 (holding that under the Oklahoma Constitution
grandparent visitation can only be granted if the child would be harmed if visitation was not
granted).
334. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the lack of guidance provided by the Troxel decision).
335. See, e.g., Jackson, 18 P.3d at 107-08 (holding that the Arizona grandparent visitation is
constitutional); Kyle 0., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 485-87 (stating that the California statute allowing
certain relatives to petition for visitation with children was unconstitutional as applied in this
case); Rideout, 761 A.2d at 301-04 (determining that the state grandparent visitation statute did
not violate the Due Process Clause); Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 498-500 (holding that the New York
grandparent visitation statute violated the parents' substantive due process rights); Fitzpatrick,
717 N.Y.S.2d at 506-07 (concluding that the New York visitation statute was constitutional);
Neal, 2000 OK 90, R 5-13, 14 P.3d at 549-51 (holding that under the Oklahoma Constitution
grandparent visitation can only be granted if the child would be harmed if visitation was not
granted).
336. Rideout, 761 A.2d at 303-04. The grandparents who sought visitation in this case had
been the primary caregivers and custodians of the children for a significant period of time. Id. at
294-95.
337. Id. at 303. The court examined Maine's statute as applied to the facts of the case before
it. Id. at 294. The court held that where a grandparent had served as the primary caregiver for a
child for a period of years, the situation warranted use of the court's parens patriae authority and
provided a compelling basis for the state's intervention into an intact family. Id. at 302.
338. Neal, 2000 OK 90, 9-13, 14 P.3d at 550-51 (holding that under the Oklahoma
Constitution grandparent visitation can only be granted if the child would be harmed if visitation
was not granted).
339. Id.I9-13, 14 P.3d at 550-51.
340. See, e.g., Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 497 (holding that the New York grandparent visitation
statute violated the parents' substantive due process rights); Fitzpatrick, 717 N.Y.S.2d 503
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grandparent visitation statute and found it constitutional. 341 The court
stated that unlike the Washington statute in Troxel, the New York
statute has been narrowly construed to allow only certain relatives to
petition for visitation. 342 In addition, the court explained that the
Washington statute did not require any special deference be given to the
wishes of the parents, but that the New York statute, as applied, gave
special deference to the wishes of the parents. 343 Finally, the court
added that New York courts carefully protected the best interests of the
child.34 In contrast, a New York trial level court examined the same
statute and reached a different conclusion.345 The court held that while
the statute only allows certain individuals to petition for visitation, the
statute contains no requirement that a court accord parents' wishes any
presumption of validity and allows the court to substitute its own
judgment for that of the parents.346 The court concluded, therefore, that
the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the parents'
fundamental rights to make decisions about the care, custody, and
control of their children. 3
47
Clearly, courts will continue to reach inconsistent conclusions
regarding the constitutionality of state statutes until the Supreme Court
grants certiorari to another case involving a third-party visitation statute
and more directly confronts the issues involved.348
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has a long history of giving
deference to parents' rights to raise their children without interference
from the government. This right has been determined to be a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the United States Constitution.
The Court has not defined the precise scope of this liberty interest,
however, leading state courts to differing conclusions as to the
constitutionality of grandparent visitation statutes.
The United States Supreme Court examined this issue in Troxel v.
Granville. The Court examined a Washington state statute and held that
(concluding that the New York visitation statute was constitutional).
341. Fitzpatrick, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 506-07.
342. Id. at 505-06.
343. Id. The court explained that, "Troxel cautions that parental decision making must be
given some deference, and as applied this has occurred in New York." Id. at 506.
344. Id. at 505.
345. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Nielsen, supra note 276, at B6.
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the statute violated the mother's due process rights as applied to the
facts of the case. The Court's unusual encroachment into the area of
family law, typically left to the states, was wholly unhelpful as a
divided Court failed to provide adequate guidance to state courts and
legislatures. This was the result of several problems with the Court's
opinion. The Troxel decision, therefore, has had minimal impact on
state courts and has resulted in continued confusion about the
requirements necessary before grandparent visitation is granted.
The Supreme Court should have taken this opportunity to make clear
that a finding of harm is not necessary prior to considering children's
best interests and to hold that children have rights which the Court will
protect. Unfortunately, however, the rights of the group of individuals
most needing the Court's protection were ignored.
